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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS IIISTORY AND MISSION 
ERn A T A . SHE E T 
Page 16, par. 9 a now reads~ •••••••••••• The 11th Armored Division 
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'. change to •••••••••••• under the jurisdiction. of 
the 20lst (I Corps) Counter 
Intelligence Corps Detach-
ment, and the two were 
operating under the super-
. vision of the 224th (XXIV 
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Part One 
THE CORPS OF INTELLIGENCE POLICE 
CHAPTER 1 
FROM 1917 to l'KlR I.D WAR II 
1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE. The material in this manual is designed to 
furnish information on the historical development of the Counter Intelli-' 
gence Corps. It covers the period from 1917 to 1945, with special 
emphasis on the war years. An attempt has been made, from the documents 
available, to describe the history and mission of the Counter Intelli-
gence Corps in the various theaters of operations. 
2. THE CORPS OF INTELLIGENCE POLICE. 'During World War I the In-
telligence Section, American Expeditionary Force, recommended and the 
War College Division sanctioned the establishment of the Corps of In-
telligence Police. Authority for such action was contained in the provi-
sions of Section II of an Act of Congress (approved 16 May 1917) giving 
the President the power to increase the Army to meet the national emer-
gency. This Corps of fifty men in the rank of sergeant of infantry was 
to report for counterespionage duty under the Commanding General, Ameri-
can Expeditionary Force. On 13 August 1917, the Corps of Intelligence 
Police was officially e~tablished by War Department General Orders. 
a. A French-speaking officer with experience in police work 
was given the mission of recruiting the men. He traveled to New Orleans 
and New York City where he advertised in the local newspapers for men 
who could speak French to do intelligence work in France. He accepted 
all candidates who could pass the Army physical examination and answer ,a 
few simple questions in French. 
b. On 25 November 1917, the Corps of Intelligence Police, 
fifty strong, arrived in St. Nazaire, France. Some were sent to British 
Intelligence at Le Havre for further training. The others were assigned 
to the rear area under the control of General Headquarters or were merged 
with divisional intelligence sections. The Le Havte Detachment worked 
at copying British suspect lists and counterespionage summaries and be-
gan indexing these lists. This training continued until a short while 
before the 'Armistice. ' 
c. In January, 1916, the Corps opened its office in Paris and 
began work on its central card file, securing names from British, French,' 
and American sources. At the end of the war this file contained some 
50,000 names. 
d. The first, actual counterespionage work was done at St. 
Nazaire where enemy agents were reported to be active. Agents appre-
, hended by the Corps of Intelligence Police were immediately turned over 
to French authorities for disposition. Civilians were .creened~ traveler. 
1 
J& 
checked, and passports examined. In addition to work of a counter-
espionage and security nature, the Corps of Intelligence Police also did 
investigative work for the Department of Criminal Investigation by con-
ducting fraud and graft inv~stigations. Members of the Corps of Intelli-
gence Police were assigned to the American Peace Delegation in Paris. 
One detachment was assigned to guard President Wilson's residence while 
he was in France. 
e. In January, 1918, authorization was granted to increase the 
Corps gradually to an eventual strength of 150 men. -One year later, 
there were 405 agents on duty with the American Expedi tionary Force. 
However, the allotted 150 vacancies were never filled because of the 
Armistice and demobilization of the Corps. 
f. Meanwhile, during the years 1911-1918, the work,of the 
Corps of Intelligence Police in the continental United States was carried 
out under the Chief of the War College Division, General Staff. On 28 
November 1911, the Corps was increased to 300 men, 250 of whom were to 
work within the United States. In March, 1918, with the aboH tion of 
the War College Drvision of the General Staff, the Corps of Intelligence 
Police was transferred to the control of the Military Intelligence Branch 
of the Executive Division of the General Staff. 
g. The next increase in strength came in an order from The 
Adjutant General dated 4 September, .1918. This was deemed necessary be-
cause of the rapid increase in the number of investigations being con-
ducted throughout the United States and the territorial departments. 
h. However, these goals were never reached, for by January, 
1920, of a total of 600 men who had been on duty in the Corps of Intelli-
gence Police, only 18 remained. This caused serious concern among those 
who saw the menace of failing to provide a permanent place for the Corps 
of Intelligence Police in the organization of the Army. Many saw the 
necessity for such personnel in New York, Washington, and the Western 
and Southern Departments for investigation and guard duties of a strictly 
confidential nature •. Therefore, authority was requested to detail not ' 
more than 24 sergeants of the duly authorized organizations of the Army 
for intelligence service. These were to be evenly divided among the 
Eastern, Western, and Southern Departments, and the District of Columbia. 
The Adjutant General granted the authority for such action on 1 February 
1920. These men were to be subject to the orders of the Department Com-
mander in whose territory they were assigned, except for the six men on 
duty with the Western Department who were to be subject to the orders of 
the Director of Military Intelligence. However, this order did not create 
a permanent status for the Corps of Intelligence Police in the organiza-
tion of the Army.< 
i. A series of memoranda, prepared by the Director of Intelli- ' 
gence, po'inted out the necessity for such a body of men, requested a 
permanent organization for the Corps of Intelligence Police. and set 
forth the quotas for the Corps Areas and Departments. The, quota of 45 
:sergeants allotted by tbe resultant order was not as great as bad been' 
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desired by the various Corps Areas and Departments, but it did give the 
Corps of Intelligence Police a permanent foothold in the organization 
of the Army. 
j. Duties of the Corps of Intelligence Police were outlined by 
the War Department in the spring of 1921. All individuals who might be 
suspected of operating against the Military Establishment were to be 
closely observed. In addition, the Corps of Intelligence Police was 
directed to report on radical activities in political and industrial 
fields. This was a tremendou. assignment for a handful of men whose 
number was reduced to a mere 30 in 1922 when the Army was cut to 125,000 
men. 
k. The policy of isolationism that swept the country at that 
time made it impossible to increase the Army in general and the Corps 
of Intelligence Police in particular. Although there was important work 
for the Corps, the palicy of the Army prohibited the Corps of Intelli-
gence Police from growing large enough to control subversive activity in, 
or directly affecting, the Military Establishment. However, in 1926, 
when it became clear that the Corps of Intelligence Police would have 
, to expand r~pidly in an emergency, a "Mobilization Plan" for the Corps' 
was drawn up. The initial strength of the Corps was set at 250 men with 
provision for increments as the mobilization progressed. The functions 
of the personnel were outlined more clearly, and a promotion plan was 
formulated. 
1. Despite the best intentions of men who were aware of the 
real value of the Corps of Intelligence Police, a further decrease 
occured in 1926, which brought the total to 28; and in November, 1933, 
strength was decreased to 15. This curtailment of essential personnel 
was effected as an economy move in the days of the depression. It was 
argued that the grades held by the men were too high for the cIeri cal 
duties they were performing. It was even suggested that other military 
personnel or civilian employees replace the Corps of Intelligence Police 
. in certain~ocalities. To this, the Philippine Department answered: 
"This Department presents a special case in that. its 
distance from the homeland, its close proximity to 
World Powers, its heterogeneous mixture of foreigners, 
and the uncertainty of the future, all tend to 
emphaSize the importance of keeping the Commanding 
General fully informed at all Urnes. In order to per- ' 
form this important duty, the scope of the organiza-
tion charged with its execution is wide and varied ••• 
All of the present members of the Corps of Intelli-
gence Police are men of proven ability, loyalty, and 
experience... Were any of these agents replaced by 
civilians or military personnel, it would confront 
this office with the necessity of building a new 
organization and discarding one which has reached its 
present state of efficiency after years of intelli-
gence, diort and experience." . 
, ,,'; 
3 
m. From 1934 to 1939, with but a single increase of one man 
authorized for work in the Philippine Department, the Corps of Intelli-
gence Police existed precariously with its small quota. Meanwhile, con-
tinued reports indicated that Japanese and Nazi activity were on the up-
swing in the Panama, Hawaiian, and Philippine Departments. Finally, in 
June, 1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a proclamation which 
stated that the control of all matters of an espionage, counterespionage. 
and sabotage nature would be handled by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of 
the War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy 
Department. The Directors of these three agencies were ordered to 
function as a committee to coordinate their activities. 
n. One year later. the chiefs of the three agencies involved 
drew up an agreement as to jurisdiction, with particular emphasis given 
to foreign operations. Further revision of this agreement, defining 
clearly the work to be handled by each agency, was made in February, 
,1942. This has become known as the Delimitations Agreement of 1942. 
o. Expansion of the Corps began almost immediately. In June, 
1940, authorization was granted to bring in an additional 26 men. In 
December, 1940, the allotment was increased to 188 men. Although some 
, difficulty was experienced in recruiting, because of a lack of definite 
standards of qualifications, it was soon established that only men of 
the highest integrity with a high school education or better would be 
selected. On 20 February 1941 a total of 288 men was reached. A total 
of 18 agents was allotted to the important Panama Canal Department. By 
31 May the over-all total swelled to 513, and by 17 February 1942 the 
Panama Canal Department' alone could count 59 men on duty there. 
p. In January, 1941, the office of the Chief of the Corps of 
Intelligence Police-Sub-Section, Investigating Section, Counter Intelli-
gence Branch, Military Intelligence Division, was established. On 24 
February 1941, the Corps of Intelligence Police Investigators School be-
came operational in ~he Army War College and, after two classes, was 
moved to Chicago. By April, Technical Manual 30-215 (Tentative) was 
published, thereby creating a definite and consistent procedure of 
training for all personnel in the Corps. 
q. On 6 December 1941, the eve of Pearl Harbor, the Corps ,of 
Intelligence Police was a permanent organization of the Army, organized 
under the direction of the Assistant Chiei of Staff, G-2, General Staii. 
It had authorization for 513 enlisted men, and had begun the task of ' 
expanding its work under the policies set forth in the Delimitations 
Agreement. Suddenly the days of begging for men and money had come to 
an end. The problem was now to grow as rapidly as pOSSible, pro.cure . 
and train lien, and do a professional job simultaneously. 
':,'';: ' 
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CHAPTER 2 
ORGAN IZATION FOR WAR 
3. THE CORPS OF INTELLIGENCE POLICE IS GEARED FOR ACTION. The out-
break of World War II called for an immediate increase in the authorized 
strength of the Corps of Intelligence Police. The total strength of the 
Corps was set at 1,026 non-commissioned officers, and all its members 
then in the Enlisted Reserve Corps were ordered to active duty "with 
the least practical delay." The War Department then set out to produce 
a well-staffed and well-trained organization for this branch of intelli-
gence work. 
4. THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS. On 13 December 1941, a letter 
from the office of The Adj utant General officially changed the name of 
the Corps of Intelligence Police to the Counter Intelligence Corps, to 
be effective 1 January 1942. This was a change in name only. However, 
~any organizational changes were made during the first two years of 
existence of the Counter Intell.gence Corps on the basis of lessons 
learned from field experience. 
a. At the outset of the war, there were many Military Intelli-
gence Division officers supervising the Corps of Intelligence Police 
who were not experienced in their duties. This deficiency was early 
recognized by the War Department, and constructive steps were taken 
i~nediately. All officers selected for duty with the Counter Intelli-
gence Corps had to be cleared by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 
before serving with the Corps. Furthermore, commanders of all Corps 
Areas, Departments (except the Philippine and Hawaiian Departments), 
and Base Defense Commands were directed to submit without delay to the 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, a roster of all commissioned personnel 
on duty 'with the Corps of Intelligence Police. 
b. In order to provide the most proficient and experienced 
counterintelligence commissioned personnel to supervise the activities 
of the Counter Intelligence Corps, it was recommended that "a complement 
of commissioned officers be specifically authorized for the Counter In-' 
telligence Corps. If It was also deemed advisable to increase the com-
missioned strength of the Corps to 543 in field and company grades and 
to bring the total non-commissioned strength to 4,431. 
c. A tentative plan of organization for Counter Intelligence 
Corps detachments to serve with tactical and headquarters units down to 
and including divisions was also drawn up. In outline, the detachments 
were to be composed in the following manner: 
, Division 1 Officer 
5 Enlisted men 
Army Corps 2 Officers 
11 Enlisted men 
5 
Field Army 6 Officers 
49 Enlisted men 
Air Forces 5 Officers 
17 Enli sted men 
Defense Command 4 Officers 
·26 Enlisted men 
In addition, Counter Intelligence Corps Headquarters, the Training 
School, the Washington Field Office, and the Replacement Pool were au-
thorized officer and enlisted v.acancies'. . 
d. At this time, each service command was given a temporary 
and permanent allotment by The Adjutant General. The temporary allot-
ment was to cover procurement when an overseas detachment was to be acti-
vated, the men therein to be transferred from the service commands. 
When men were transferred from the service commands for this purpose, 
the temporary allotment for the new detachment was reduced by The 
Adjutant General and the new detachment simultaneously set up. 
e. In October, 1942, the system of temporary allotments to the 
service commands was discontinued, and all such allotments were trans-
. ferred to the War Department Reserve. Pool. Thi s Reserve Pool was then 
. apportioned among the service commands for procurement purposes. When 
'a tactical detachment was activated, an allotment.was provided from the 
service commands as before; and the apportionment of the War Department 
Reserve Pool decreased by the grades of the men transferred. 
f. It was anticipated early in 1942. that the constant loss .of 
men in service commands, because of the demands of overseas units, 
would seriously hamper operations. Consequently, on 14 May, the· corps 
areas (service commands) were directed by Military Intelligence Section 
to submit a list of special agents considered "key personnel" with a 
brief explanation of the pOSitions these men held. Because of a tend-
ency on the part of "the corps areas .to include a large number of men on 
such listings, it soon became necessary to limit "key personnel" in the 
corps areas to 10% of the total personnel in each command. 
g. In April, 1943, it was determined that since all Counter 
Intelligence Corps personnel were chargeable to War Department overhead, 
. they should be assigned to the War Department and attached to the 
various service commands for administrative purposes. Consequently, the 
allotments to the service commands were rescinded, and two months later-
the allotments to the theaters of operations were rescinded. In 
September, 1943, TM 30-215, "Counter Intelligence Corps,· set forth a 
TIO basis for assignment of personnel to the theaters of operations. 
The balance of the Counter Intell igence C.orps personnel was to be 
aSSigned to Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces, and other utilizing 
units. . 
h. 'The increase in personnel made it necessary to expand the 
CounterIntelligence Corps administrative Machinery to meet the new 
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demand.. In December, 1942, the office of the Chief, Counter Intelli-
gence Corps, was divided into six sections: Supply, Operations, Fiscal, 
Plans and Training, Personnel, and Army Air Forces Liaison. 
i. The procurement and training of Counter Intelligence Corps 
personnel for overseas duty became the primary mission of the office of 
the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps. Demands for assignment of 
Counter Intelligence Corps detachments, both to units scheduled for imme-
diate departure to overseas duty and for units already in combat in 
,the theaters of operations, were steadily increasing. To meet these 
demands and to facilitate training, the War Department, on 29 October, 
1942, instructed all Bases, Departments, and Service Commands (except the 
Ninth) to establish preliminary Counter Intelligence Corps training 
schools in their respective commands. 
j. In an attempt to make the administration of the Counter 
telligence Corps more definitive, the Deputy Chief of Staff, on 25 
'November, 1943, directed that certain recommendations made by the In-
spector General be carried out. These included the following: 
,)0' " 
(1)· Two changes in baSic policy: 
(a) The Counter Intelligence Corps was to be 
'utilized, with certain limited exceptions, 
in theaters of operations. 
(b) Personnel of the Corps were to be released 
from War Department overhead assignments, 
distributed on' a T/O baSis, with G-2 
exercising no command function over the 
Corps. 
(2) Three specific continuing responsibilities relative 
to the Counter Intelligence Corps charged to the 
. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department: 
(a) The establishment of policies and over-all 
supervision of counterintelligence activities. 
(b) Coordination of the procurement and shipment 
of Counter Intelligence Corps units. 
(c) The administration of specialized training 
prior to assignment of Counter Intelligence 
Corps personnel to theaters of operations. 
(3) Certain specific actions relative to the Counter 
. Intelligence Corps: 
(a) The Counter Intelligence Corps Headquarters 
in Baltimore, Maryland, and. the Counter In-
telligence Corps Staging Area were to be 
eliminated. 
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(b) G-2, War Department, in collaboration witb 
the three major commands, and G-3, War 
Department, were to submit for approval a 
plan for procurement of Counter Intelli-
gence Corps personnel. 
'(c) Counter Intelligence Corps units were to 
be organized on a TIO basis included in 
troop quotas. 
(d) Command channels were to be used and com-
mand responsibility emphaSized. 
(e) Shipment of Counter Intelligence Corps 
personnel overseas was to be in accordance 
with approved requests of theater com-
manders. 
(f) Basic training of counterintelligence 
personnel was to be provided by Army 
Service Forces. ' 
(g) Counter Intelligence Corps specialized 
training was to be given by Military In-
telligence Division at Camp Ritchie, 
Maryland. 
(h) Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in 
permanent detachments of Service Commands 
were, to be transferred for aSSignment to 
those Service Commands by 31 December 1943. 
k. On 14 December, 1943, War Department Circular No. 324 trans-
ferred the counterintelligence functions within the zone of the interior 
to the Provost Marsl)al General. The i nvestigati ve functions hitherto 
performed by the Counter Intelligence Corps and those of the Provost 
Marshal General were consolidated, and it was directed that these func-
tions be performed by a single staff agency under each Service Command. 
This agency was later designated the Security and Intelligence Division. 
1. Since the Counter Intelligence Corps was no longer to be 
, the organization conducting investigations of espionage and sabotage 
cases for the Military Intelligence Division in the continental United 
States, it was necessary that the responsibility for discharging these 
functions be placed with the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, 
and designated areas. The assignment of Counter Intelligence Corps 
personnel to the Service Commands, where they became part of the newly 
formed Security and Intelligence Division under the jurisdiction of the 
Provost Marshal General, was also provided in War Department Circular 
324. The assignment of personnel from War Department overhead to the , 
using commands with instructions to activate under T/O&E 30-500 was an' 
, entirely new concept for the Counter Intelligence Corps, and great, 
, administrative difficulties attended this change of activity •• '. ., 
8 
ill 
[ 
r 
rr,", Ii. 
rJ 
., 
~;H] 
1I'l"L,~ 
~'-1""" 
m. On 22 May 1944 a reorganization within the Military In-
telligence Section replaced the office formerly known as the Counter In-
telligence Corps Branch of the Military Intelligence Section with the 
title of the Counter In~elligence Corps Section. A G-2, War Department 
Policy Staff was created. This staff was responsible for policy de-
cisions on intelligence functions, including the Counter Intelligence 
Corps. No important alterations in policy or duties accompanied this 
redesignation. However, since the function of the Counter Intelligence 
Corps Section was considered to be of an administrative and operational 
nature rather than a true staff function, on 1 August 1944 the Section 
was transferred from the control of the General Staff, War Department, 
to the Army Service Forces. 
n. By this time the Counter Intelligence Corps had operated 
successfully overseas in every combat area and had obtained a troop 
basis of 4,308. These were allocated in the following manner: 
" Theaters of Operation, Base Commands, and 
other overseas installations ••••••••••••••••••• 3,000 
Army Ground Forces in United States ••••••••• '..... 485 
Army Air Forces in United States and Air 
Transport COUlllaDd. 0 •• CI ........ • ' ........ 8 •••••• 0. • • 823 
TOTAL. • • • • • •• 4. 308 
, The overseas allotments increased as additional Army Ground Forces units 
were trained and shipped to combat. Counter Intelligence Corps detach-
ments were assigned to their respective units and became an integral 
part of divisions', corps, armies, overseas administrative commands, 
theater headquarters, and of the A-2 Sections of the Air Force commands 
and installations. 
o. On 1 December 1944 the Counter Intelligence Corps became 8 
separate branch of the Intelligence Division of the Army Service Forces. 
Under the Army Service Forces the policy of aSSigning all Counter Intelli~ 
gence Corps detachments to using units was continued. The only Counter 
, Intelligence Corps detachments working within the zone of the interior 
were those units specifically allowed to do so by the War Department. 
5. PERSONNEL PROCUREMENT. The administrative difficulties that 
, were met in the early days of the Counter Intelligence Corps were 
paralleled by an equally difficult task of procuring desired personnel. 
On 21 October 1942 the power to initiate Counter Intelligence Corps per-
sonnel investigations was placed within the Service Commands. The com-
mands were also empowered to assign and transfer personnel as Counter, 
, Intelligence Corps agents in the grade of corporal, and as Counter In-
telligence Corps clerks in the grade of private first class. Control 
over the assignment and transfer of Counter Intelligence Corps special 
agent., the promotion of personnel from the rank of agent to special , 
agent, and all matters concerning the assignmeilt or transfer of' '" 
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. cOlllllliuioned personnel r_ined with the AllistantCBief of Staff, G-2, 
War Department. 
a. A backlog of ~nvestigations to be conducted on prospective 
Counter Intelligence Corpl personnel developed during this period. 
Until June. 1943. Counter Intelligence Corpl agents and clerk. bad been 
recruited by tbe tbeater commanders in oversea. areas on the same ba.i. 
as in the Service Commands. However. on 26 June, the allotments to 
tbeaters were discontinued. 1M 30-215, "Counter Intelligence Corps." 
published 22 September 1943. limited the responsibility for procurement 
and assignment of officers and special agents to the Assistant Chief of 
Staff, G-2, War Department, and of agents and clerks to the Director 
. of Intelligence in the Service Commands within tbe zone of the interior. 
All Counter Intelligence Corp. personnel procured in tbeaters of opera-
. tiona were to be approved by the Assistant Cbief of Staff, G-2. War 
Department. 
b. As an aid in spotting potential Counter Intelligence Corp. 
personnel, tbe classification "301 Investigator" was introduced into 
tbe Army classification sy.tem early in 1942. The names of all men 
under thil classification were referred to tbe office of tbe Chief, 
Counter Intelligence Corps. for review and selection of prospective 
personnel. Men who were given the classification of "213 Stenograpber.-
were also brougbt to tbe attention of tbi. office so tbat from tbi. 
group suitable clerks migbt be procured. Wben tbe procurement of 
Counter Intelligence Corps personnel was decentralized to the Servi~e 
Commands in October, 1942, the names of men in tbe 301 and 213 classifi-
cation were reported directly to the Service Commands by the reception 
'centers. During 1942'and 1943, tbe office of· Tbe Adjutant General fur-
nisbed tbe office of tbe Chief. Counter Intelligence Corps. extracts 
, from qualification cards on all linguists inducted into tbe Army. 
c. The largest percentage of Counter Intelligence Corps agent. 
was obtained from personnel already in tbe Army. At the reception 
centers newly inducted personnel with basic Counter Intelligence Corps 
qualifications were' interviewed by Counter Intelligence Corps agents to 
determine their suitability for assignment to Counter Intelligence 
,Corps duty. Civilian and government organizations which employed in-
, vestigators were requested to submit information concerning former in-
vestigators in their employ who had been inducted into the military 
service. In the early days of the organization of the Counter Intelli-
gence Corps. men occasionally applied for admission to the Corps prior· 
to their induction into the Army. If application was approved. they 
were immediately "tabbed" and shortly thereafter transferred to the 
Counter Intelligence Corps. This method was not widely used because it 
resulted in personnel being transferred into the Corps without basic 
military training. Lack of basic training later proved to be a handi-
cap to theie agenti when they were assigned to tactical detacbments. 
d. To meet the demands for qualified men, recommendations 
were accepted from POlt intelligence officers, Counter lntell.igence 
Corps personnel, and any other military personnel who knew of men wIth 
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basic Counter Intelligence Corps qualifications. All commanding officers 
throughout the Army were encouraged to submit names of men with the 
basic qualifications for Counter Intelligence Corps duty. 
e. In the 'early recruitment, emphasis was placed on investi-
gative or legal experience. Later, men with adequate education, good 
character, and loyalty were accepted even though they had neither legal 
nor investigative experience. Some linguists were procured, but this 
qualification was not an exclusive one. Men were drawn from all types 
of civilian occupations, and the Counter Intelligence Corps became an 
organization which included representatives of virtually every profession 
and nationality. In spite of the fact that most of these men worked as 
corporals or sergeants, the organization obtained outstanding men. The 
lure of the word "intelligence" and the prospect of working in civilian 
clothes was tempting bait; but if the men of the Corps had not been 
carefully selected, their records in the war would have been less 
impressive. Counter Intelligence Corps men have always relied upon 
their own initiative. This has been borne out by the nature of their 
work in the United States and, to an even greater extent, by the record 
they have made in overseas operations. 
f. For the most part, men selected for the Counter Intelli-
gence Corps were well suited for their tasks, but one major weakness in 
the recruiting program was very noticeable. Not enough emphasis was 
given to procuring and training linguists. The problem of obtaining men 
fluent in French, German, Italian, Japanese, and other foreign languages 
was made more difficult because of War Department policy which directed 
that no persons of close foreign background would be assigned to or re-
tained in the Counter Intelligence Corp's. Many naturalized Americans, 
both in and out of the Army, were fluent in several languages, but the 
Counter Intelligence Corps was unable to use this source of language per~ 
sonne 1 because of this strict policy. When the war in Europe came to an 
end, the Army was faced with the overwhelming task of procuring a large 
number of men fluent in foreign languages. This necessity brought a 
quick reversal of policy and; thereafter, close foreign relations alone 
ceased to be considered sufficient to disqualify a man for the Corps. 
6. THE PROBLEM OF RANK. The rank of the agent was at best a par-
tial secret within the Army. Counter Intelligence Corps men were in-
structed to conceal their actual rank by using the term "agent" or 
"special agent." Concealment of rank in the zone of the interior was not 
. too great a problem since agents worked in civilian clothes. The aver-
age civilian respected Counter Intelligence Corps credentials and wa. 
not concerned with the actual rank of the bearer. 
a. When his mission was changed from the zone of the interior 
to foreign theaters of operations, the Counter Intelligence Corps agent, 
in some cases, wore the military uniform indicating his status. This 
factor was a disadvantage in dealing with officers of the United States 
Army and officers of the Allied Forces. The low rank of the leaders of 
some detachments often had a hampering effect, especially in their re- . 
lationihipi with allied lerrice. in thetheatera and with coordinate .. 
11· 
agencies in the United States. In many theaters this difficulty of 
rank was overcome by the adoption of a uniform limilar to that of war 
correspondent which showed no rank. . '. . 
, 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE COUNTER INTEU.IGENCE CORPS 
IN TIlE ZONE OF THE INTERIOR, 1941-1943 
7. THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION. As a result of the De-
limitations Agreement of 1939, the counterintelligence system was cen-
tralized under three agencies. The task assigned to the United States 
Army covered both the Military Establishment and a large percentage of 
the munitions industry. The primary counterintelligence effort was the 
organization of a security system which would prevent access of hostile 
agents to our facilities. 
a. Countless security surveys were made. Safeguards were de-
veloped, and identification systems were established. Thousands of per-
son~el investigations were conducted; and, as these proceeded, steps 
were taken to place persons whose loyalty was in question on work where 
they could not injure our war effort. . 
b. There were individual cases of sabotage and these, of 
course, became the immediate subject of intensive investigation. A few 
saboteurs and spies were captured and convicted. Even in cases where 
investigation failed to uncover the perpetrator, exhaustive investi-
gation resulted in the development of better security measures. 
c. A special effort was made to safeguard military information. 
Counter Intelligence Corps personnel operated the security system for 
the headquarters that planned the North African campaign. In many cases 
where the Counter Intelligence Corps found improper safeguarding of mili-
tary information, strategic plans were changed or revoked. 
d. During the years 1942-1943, agents of the Counter Intelli-
gence Corps made thousands of loyalty investigations on military per-
sonnel and Civilians assigned to duties requiring access to classified . 
material. The transfer of certain investigative fu'nctions from the Mili-
tary Intelligence Division to the Provost Marshal General in October, 
1941, did not relieve the Corps of the duty of investigating personnel 
already in military service who were working with classified material. 
Typical examples of such personnel were cryptographers; certain Signal . 
Corps personnel in other types of work; Military Intelligence personnel 
(civilian and military); and, of course, as a large part of the last 
mentioned category, potential Counter Intelligence Corps personnel. 
e. The forms used and the extent of the investigations varied 
in accordance with War Department and Service Command policy. Investi-
gations of prospective Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were always 
exhau.Uve. 
f. Loyalty Investigations which involved no suspicion of dis-
loyal ty condsted of an examination o'f personal history, education, 
employment, and a,sociations. Each subject of a per.onnel inve.tigation 
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was required to complete a Personal History Statement. In each per-
sonnel investigation, a check was made of the local police, the Fedetal 
Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the 
Military Intelligence Division files. Copi'es of each memorandum re-
port were sent to the Service Commands interested, the Military In-
telligence Division, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
g. Investigations of military personnel suspected of disaffec-
tion, espionage, treason, sedition, sabotage, or of violations of 
All 300-5, "Safeguarding Military Information," were reported on War De-
, partment Form C IR 1 (Counter Intelligence Report No. 1). This form 
contained a summarization by the investigating agent, a detailed out-
line of the subject's personal background, and a recommendation for 
disposition of the subject in accordance with the purpose of the in-
vestigation. 
h. The Service Command Counter Intelligence Corps detachments 
were divided into several field offices, each having investigative re-
sponsibility for a certain geographic area of the Service Command. In 
certain less populated areas, single representatives were used and de-
signated as resident agents. In metropolitan field offices with many 
,agents, the personnel operated in separate sections and squads under 
the direction of special agents of proved experience and ability • 
. These sections performed specific types of investigations. Agents be-
came specialists in one type of investigation, developed local contacts 
of value in their particular field, and accumulated a general knowledge 
of organizations and individuals in the area considered subversive or 
of questionable loyalty. 
i. Exclusive of background investigations, the largest volume 
of investigations consisted of disaffection cases. Disaffection has 
been defined as a state of mind indicating a lack of affection for the 
. United States Government. Such cases usually concerned persons with 
German, Italian, or Japanese backgrounds. 
j. In the 'field of suspected sabotage and espionage, the 
Counter Intelligence Corps performed investigations which often employed 
the use of technical investigative equipment. The Counter Intelligence 
Corps mission in the zone of the interior was not as dramatic as that 
of federal agencies which apprehended espionage agents. The efforts of. 
the Counter Intelligence Corps, however, denied access to vital indus-
trial plants and to highly secret military installations to many 
persons whose loyalty to the United States was dubious. What damage 
these persons might have wrought on the war effort is only a matter of 
conj ecture. 
k. In the fall of 1943, the Inspector General conducted an 
extensive examination of Counter Intelligence Corps activities in the 
Service Commands. The resultant recommendations brought about a re-
organization of the Corps both in its activity in the Service Commands, 
and in foreign theaters. Of special import was the suggestion that 
Counter Intelligence Corps personnel 
14 
..... be specifically procured and trained for 
utilization in theaters of operation;. that they 
be so utilized that Counter Intelligence Corps 
activities within the Zone of Interior be per-
formed by the Security Intelligence Corps of 
the Provost Marshal General's Department." 
1. Since the future Counter Intelligence Corps mission would 
be entirely overseas, it was necessary to administer the program of the 
Counter Intelligence Corps and train and procure the personnel especially 
for that purpose. The largest source of personnel, the Service Command 
detachments, was no longer available, thereby necessitating a new method 
of procurement. The office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, in 
Baltimore, Maryland, was discontinued, and all administration was hand-
led by the Counter Intelligence Section of the Counter Intelligence Group, 
Military Intelligence Service. The staff of this office was much 
smaller than it had been in the office of the Chief, Counter Intelli-
gence Corps. 
m. After a period of training and reorganization, the Counter 
Intelligence Corps was sent to the combat zones. It was here that the 
real value and meaning of the Corps became known to combat commanders •. 
The record and achievements of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel, 
brought added prestige to tbe Corps and to the Armed Forces of tbe 
United State •• 
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Par,t Two 
OPERATI!l'lS OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS 
IN T\IE PRINCIPAL THEATERS 
CHAPTER 4 
OPERATIOOS IN NaiTII AFRICA 
8. THE MlSSION. The Counter Intelligence Corps mission in combat 
was to protect troops, equipment, and installations from enemy espionage 
and sabotage. North Africa was the scene of the first tactical use of 
'the Counter Intelligence Corps. 
9. THE LANDINGS. After a period of several months' intensive 
training and orientation, the Counter Intelligence Section, G-2, Western 
Task Force, began its activities on 8 November 1942 by making the land-
ing in French Morocco with the assault troops. The landing was made at 
Fedala with elements of the 3rd Division. Counter Intelligence Corps 
personnel were successful in the capture of a mass of documents in a 
hotel that was used as headquarters by members of the German Armistice 
Commission. Brigadier General Arthur R. Wilson appropriately evaluated 
the captured material in one sentence: "Hitler's <Armistice) COIMIission' 
has saved the American Army a great deal of work." In addition, the 
Counter Intelligence Corps captured a group of Italian nationals at 
Fedala whose presence there was a source of danger to the security of 
, the American Army during the initial assault. 
a. A Counter Intelligence Corps contingent accompant~d they I 
9th Infantry Division when it landed at Port Lyautey. The ~ Armored' 
Division with its Counter Intelligence Corps component and elements of 
the 9th Infantry Division made the landing at Safi under heavy fire. 
!T 
In Algiers, the Counter Intelligence Corps landed with the first boats 
and seized a number of Nazi suspects as well as important documents. 
At the close of the" first day of operations, the Counter Intelligence 
Corps had established positions stretched over some seven hundred miles 
of coastline. ' ' 
b. On 11 November the Counter Intelligence Corps, with ele-
ments of the 3rd Division, took part in the encirclement of Casablanca. 
At Casablanca, among the documents seized were German lists of French 
Axis sympathizers as well as a c~nplete Italian Secret Service list of 
French Intelligence Service members. Consequently, these compromised 
., French agents were replaced by men unknown to the enemy. 
c. In these early operations against the enemy, the Counter , 
Intelligence Corps made a favorable impression,with the troop cOlMlanders. 
The Corps proved that it was not just a rear echelon organization. 
For their heroism under fire, many ,of its members received decorations 
which included the Soldier's Medal, the Silver Star, and the Legion of 
Merit award. 
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10. OHGAN lZATIOO FOR OpmATIOO WITH COMBAT TROOPS. After the land-
ing, Counter Int:elligence Corps personnel were relieved from attachment 
to divisions and were attached to IVestern Task Force Headquarters. They 
were then deployed on a territorial basis in various cities along the 
Moroccan seaboard. Shortly thereafter, the Western Task Force was dis-
solved and its Counter Intelligence Corps personnel briefly joined the 
First Armored Corps. On 9 February, they were attached to Headquarters, 
Fifth Army, a new army which had been organized in North Africa,only the 
previous month. 
a. The Counter Intelligence Corps then assumed counterintelli-
gence jurisdiction over all French Morocco except those portions covered 
by the Atlantic and Mediterranean Base Sections. Eventually, a part of 
Algeria was included as well. Freedom of action was curtailed, however, 
because under the terms of the Armistice Agreement the French retained 
the powers of arrest and search. As a result, Counter Intelligence Corps 
operations in Nortll Africa after the Armistice were conducted under the 
closest advisement of the French intelligence agencies there. 
b. During the occupational phase in North Africa, the mission 
of the Counter Intelligence Corps slowly began to crystalize. Every 
precaution was taken to prevent enemy communications in the occupied 
area. As a means of neutralizing the efforts of Axis sympathizers, a 
diligent search was carried out for all caches of arms, ammunition, or 
other contraband. Investigations were carried out on all suspicious 
persons and incidents reported by units. 'By interrogation and from 
'relevant documents, a great deal of security information was amassed. 
From the intelligence thus collected, the Counter Intelligence Corps was 
able to give assistance and advice to the combat troops in the GlPplica- ' 
tion of security precautions to vital installations such as ports, 
utilities, dumps, communications, and other areas. 
c. One of the tasks performed by the Counter Intelligence 
Corps in forward areas was the search of enemy headquarters and local 
administrative·and police offices. This made it necessary for Counter 
Intelligence Corps personnel to arrive on the scene in time to protect 
documents from destruction and dissipation. In the performance of these 
duties Counter Intelligence Corps sections. were sent well forward, and 
in some instances were the first troops to enter towns and villages. 
, They performed functions varying from those of the mayor of a town to 
those of the infantryman. 
11. OPERATIOOS IN LIBmATED AIlEAS. The Counter Intelligence Corps 
, North African operations were difficult in the liberated areas due to 
the fluid political situation. Precautions had to be taken to prevent 
enemy communications. Civilian telephone calls were subject to spot 
monitoring; and when certain telephone users incurred suspicion, the 
telephones were monitored continuously. At Fedala, Counter Intelligence 
Corps personnel discovered that Axis-paid agents had installed a moni-
toring board to cover American Headquarters. This board was neutralized 
oefore it had beoun to operate. Cooperation was also given to the 
, Signal Intelligence Service in the interception of short-wave radio 
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:ansmitters. The Counter Intelligence Corps furnished leads to Signal 
Intelligence which located the transmitters, and the stations were 
prompt] y raided. Conti nuous ,moni tori nil was necessary because enemy 
transmitters changed frequencies and often would broadcast no more than 
fifteen minutes a day, and then at irregular intervals. 
a. The enemy attempted to infiltrate agents through Spanish 
,Morocco in an effort to gain information concerning the movement of 
troops and troop concentrations. These agents were intercepted by a 
frontier control system established soon after the landing phase. 
Similar attempts were made at the French Border Control Stations. 
Counter Intelligence Corps agents worked with the French in checking 
applications for border passage. In one instance, the border agents 
. were informed that an Arab woman, employed by a German agent, would 
attempt to cross the border with short-wave equipment concealed in her 
voluminous dress. The tip was correct and the equipment was seized. 
b. The Counter Intelligence Corps was also assigned the task 
of providing protection of supplies, installations, and personnel. To 
carry out this function, Counter Intelligence Corps agents installed 
and supervised pass systems at ports, conducted security surveys, and 
investigated port personnel. Working with the Navy at one port, the 
Counter Intelligence Corps established a pass system which cleared more 
than 3,000 French and native workers daily without incident. Informant 
nets facilitated this work. Many of the native informants worked with 
labor gangs. 
c. In conjunction wi th these duties," the Counter Intelligence 
Corps gathered information concerning the-trend of political thinking 
in occupied and friendly territories. This was carried on by Counter 
Intelligence Corps agents in plain clothes. In addition, because of 
'the exigencies of war, United States censorship in French Morocco was 
for a time placed in the hands of the Corps. Perhaps the most impor-
tant duty assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps in this Theater was' 
the security preparation and supervision ~f the Roosevelt-Churchill 
Casablanca Conference. The bodyguard was provided by the Secret Service. 
Security for the area was a duty assigned to Counter Intelligence Corps 
,agents in plain clothes aided by a battalion of Military Police. The 
success of these multitudinous tasks was achieved only by close coop-
eration with 'other agencies. 
12. LIAISON WITH UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS. The 
Counter Intelligence Corps North African experience proved that American 
forces could 'operate successfully as a team. There was close coop-
eration between the Counter Intelligence Corps and the Psychological War- -' 
fare Board, Signal Intelligence, Office of Naval Intelligence, the 
Allied Force Headquarters Documents Section, Allied Military Government, 
Prisoner of War Interrogation Teams', and the Office of Strategic 
Services. ' 
13. LIAISON WITII ALLIED INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS. Liaison was 
sought wi th the French Service de Renseignements,. Contre-Espionage, . 
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Offices of the Securite Militnire, Police Administration, Bureau de 
Surveillance du Territoire, and others. However, in many instances in 
the interior of French Morocco, these French agencies did not make 
available to the Counter, Intelligence Corps all the information at their 
disposal. This was not true in the frontier regions where close coopera-
tion continued to exist among the American, British and French agencies. 
In the interior, all counterintelligence matters were left in the hands 
of the French. Freedom of activity was exercised by the BritiSh and 
Americans only over their own installations and personnel. This difficulty 
continued to be a thorn in the side of many detachment commanders who 
sought to eliminate duplications of effort. 
14. LESSONS LEARNED TlmoUG!I EXPERIENCE. Operations in liberated 
areas proved that the most successful personnel device was a linguist 
agent and a non-linguist agent working as a team in surveillances and 
interrogations. In the matter of wearing civilian clothes, it was found 
that the best results were accomplished by consistency on the part of 
the individual agent. During this phase of operations, some experience 
was gained in the use of technical equipment which included cameras, 
typewriters, fingerprint sets, and telephone taps. Monitoring control 
boards came to be used with increased frequency in the maintenance of 
security controls. 
a. It was impossible to build a defense so perfect that the 
enemy could be completely prevented from gaining any intelligence. 
There are two reasons for this:' First, no human arrangements can be 
perfect; second, a perfect defense would result in halting all opera-
tions. The end to be achieved was the concealment of operations. 
b. It became apparent, however, that a barbed wire barricade 
did not necessarily net an enemy agent in every instance and that the 
counterintelligence officer spent "99 percent of his time devising, 
building, arranging, and inspecting ways and means of forcing the enemy 
to expose himself." Security had to be devised in a manner that would 
not interfere with operations. The more difficult it was to penetrate, 
the defense system, the more effort the enemy agent had to make; and 
the more activity indulged in, the more he exposed himself. Sooner or 
later the alarm system had to go off. 
15. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DURING TilE TACTICAL PLANNING PHASES. The 
planning of a new operation, particularly a water-borne assault, took 
several months. The first task was the security of the perimeter and 
a rigidly controlled pass system for visi tors. In addi tion, a series 
of lectures to officers and clerical personnel was of value in safe-
guarding documents and telephone conversations. A list of officers, 
nominated to discuss the plan with other sections or headquarters, was 
of prime importance. It tended to prohibit leaks from doubtful personnel. 
a. During the planning period, the counterintelligence officer 
was required to produce detailed plans and arrangements for the security 
of training, concentration, staging, and mounting of troops. The most 
difficult task encountered was the production of a plan for 
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counterintelligence and security procedure during the coming campaign. 
All details were settled at this time and the commanders' instructions 
disseminated to troops. All staff sections and troops concerned studied 
instructions; consequently; later misunderstandings were avoided. By 
constant interview, conference, and correspondence with all concerned, 
the counterintelligence officer produced his plan and instructions. 
16. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DURING MOUNTING PHASE OF TACTICAL 
OPERATIONS. During the mounting phase, troop commanders required assist-
ance in their staging and mounting areas. It became the duty of the 
Counter Intelligence Corps during this phase to assist the appropriate 
headquarters in such capacity as the commander deemed appropriate. A 
list of suggestions was made up as an aid to the various commanders in 
the interest of complete security of movement. It was required that all 
possible compromises of security be reported promptly. Tactical or 
strategic surprise was the paramount consideration of all commanders. 
Care was taken also to avoid all indications among the Civilian popula-
. tion that an operation was pending. 
17. CONCLUSIONS. In the North African Operation, the Counter In-
telligence Corps learned many lessons, but this was only a testing 
ground for the real work that lay ahead in Italy and later in France 
and Germany. In Italy, the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps 
and the value of the Corps came 'to be more fully recognized by divisi9n, 
corps, and army commanders. . 
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CilAPrER 5 
OPERATIONS IN SICILY 
18. PRE-INVASION PROGRAM. By April, 1943, a central Theater 
Counter Intelligence Corps Ileadquarters to handle the administration of 
the Counter Intelligence Corps had been established at Allied Force 
Headquarters. The only drawback in this new set-up was the absence of 
a Table of Organization. This created many problems, chief among which 
was a laCk of adequate technical supplies. In Maya Counter Intelli-
gence Corps field training school was established near Oran in anticipa-
tion of the coming Sicilian and Italian campaigns. With few exceptions, 
every officer and enlisted man coming over from the United States after 
the capture of Tunisia attended the sChool. Instructors were chosen 
from among those Counter Intelligence Corps and other intelligence 
officers who had combat and actual field experience. British Intelli-
gence loaned an officer who had been through the campaigns in France, 
Greece, Crete, and Libya. 
19. STAGING AREA PREPARATIONS AND DUTIES. Agents were dispatched 
to diviSion, corps, and army headquarters to live with troops with which 
they would be working. They were attached to a company (usually a 
service company) for rations and quarters, and their detaChment com-
mander was attached to the headquarters of the organization. Each 
Counter Intelligence Corps officer prepared an operational plan for the 
troop unit to which his detachment was attached. Operational plans were 
prepared for each province in Sicily, and target areas were mapped out 
for each city of consequence. 
a. Security surveys were conducted for the staging area, 
embarkation points, and areas adjacent to the mounting areas. The Counter 
Intelligence Corps also assisted in maintaining security in the staging 
areas. All officers and agents began to educate troops in security, and 
troops were instructed to bring any seized documents and maps to Counter 
Intelligence Corps Headquarters. Moreover, they were warned to observe 
censorship rules. The dangers of souvenier hunting and methods of 
dealing with booby traps were also discussed. 
b. Counter Intelligence Corps teams continued their Own train-
ing which consisted of physical exercise, handling special equipment, 
and a detailed study of the Counter Intelligence Corps operational plan. 
All agentS were given specific instructions as to their conduct if 
captured. In addition, operational plans were expanded into a "Standing 
Operating Procedure" by each detachment. This document included specific 
duties for each man. 
c. these Counter Intelligence Corps teams were attached to the 
field army, corps, divisions, pnd an Army group, by Headquarters, Counter· 
Intelligence Corps, Allied Force Headquarters. A total of 16 Counter 
Intelligence Corps officers and 76 Counter Intelligence Corps agents were 
distributed WRong Seventh Army (Headquarter. and Field.Army Section), 
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II Corps, VI Corps, 1st Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, and 
Qth Infantry Division. For embarkation, the sections were divided so 
Qat no more than four Counter Intelligence Corps agents were on any 
one vessel. This was done to minimize casualties in the event of lea 
attack. 
20. OPERATION WITH COMBAT !ROOfS. The general plan followed by 
detachments with attacking forces was for divisional and a part of corps 
personnel to move forward with assault troops. As towns were taken, the 
divisional detachments ,continued forward with assault troops while corps 
personnel performed Counter' Intelligence Corps functions in the captured 
towns. This method varied; however, division detachments generally 
operated with reconnaissance and assault troops to be in a position to 
obtain vital information for the G-2. 
a. Counter Intelligence Corps agents participated in the in-
vasion at Gela and Licata. The 2nd Armored Division captured Palermo" 
and the task of providing security for that city was assigned to its 
Counter Intelligence Corps section. The Seventh Army Counter Intelli-
gence Corps Detachment relieved them and this change-over remained the 
pattern that was followed by divisional detachments whose normal stay 
in any town was from one to three days. 
b. Several times Counter Intelligence Corps sections even 
entered towns ahead of other troops. When Agrigento, a city of 40,000, 
was evacuated by enemy troops on 17 July. seven Counter Intelligence 
Corps soldiers were there alone for at least five hours immediately. 
after the Germans' withdrawal. The agents found a hysterical, fear-
crazed mob looting and rioting. These agents, through the aggressive 
use of city officials, Carabinieri, firemen, and priests, had the situa-
tion under control by the morning of the 16th. In any event, the 
Counter Intelligence Corps was prepared to use force to stop food riots, 
, especially prior to the arrival of AMGOT personnel. 
c. By 0 plus 2, Counter Intelligence Corps sections had ob-
tained overlays of the major mine fields in Sicily. This information 
was immediately relayed to G-2'5. Army engineers quickly neutralized 
these fields, with the result that many thousands of American lives and 
tons of equipment were saved. 
d. In many cases the rapid advance resulted in a complete lack 
of Army personnel, and it was necessary to detail guard functions to 
the Carabinieri. Aggressive instruction by Counter Intelligence Corps 
officers and agents brougbtsatisfactory cooperation. With no American 
guard available, documents which could not be transferred immediately 
to proper authority were placed in a room and a seal placed on the door 
with a written warning that anyone breaking the seal would be shot. In 
over 200 cases where the seal was used, not one was b,roken oth~r than 
by proper authority. 
e. Problet1lll appeared and multiplied with -each new situation, 
'but the Counter Intelligence Corps met them. The mission oi the 
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Counter Intelligence Corps ceased to be a theory after the landing on 
the beaches of Sicily. It had crystalized into a working principle 
easily adaptable in this type of warfare where armies depend almost 
exclusively on intelligence for successful operations. 
f. The effectiveness of the security provided by the Counte'r 
Intelligence Corps was attested to by the capture, in November, of a 
group of admitted pro-Fascists and saboteurs. Agents of the Counter 
Intelligence Corps in Trapani, Sicily, uncovered this organization 
which was founded to reorganize the Fascist Party in Sicily and Italy 
and to sabotage Allied installations. The group, financed by a wealthy 
girl, consisted of twenty-eight persons. Two of the original founders 
readily admitted sabotaging a communications line near Trapani. The 
Counter Intelligence Corps agents.had known of the activities of this 
group since early October. They were closely watched until all of them 
could be taken into custody at one time. 
g. Upon entry the Counter Intelligence Corps section imme-
diately took over control of the city pending the arrival of either a 
control group from Division or from AMGOT. Immediate steps were taken 
to control the municipality, the Carabinieri, the police and prisons, 
business activities, public utilities, and military and political or-
ganizations and their headquarters. The Church was asked to cooperate; 
and after necessary conferences with the leading military, civil, 
and religious authorities, a proclamation was issued imposing the 
necessary restrictions on the civil and political life of the community. 
Everything was done to assist the local reepresentative of the Division . 
Commander, and later of AMGOT, in bringing. the community back to normal 
without interfering or delaying the accomplishment of the combat mission 
of the Division. The work of the section was completed when it turned 
over its responsibilities to either the Corps Counter Intelligence Corps 
section, or the representative of AMGOT. 
h. By the end of July every large town in the Seventh Army 
sector had .been entered and was under investigation by Counter Intelli-
gence Corps personnel. Smaller towns in outlying reg~ons were placed 
under investigation as time permitted. With the conclusion of Opera-
tion Husky, the Counter Intelligence Corps was exercising counterin-
telligence control over the entire conquered territory. Operation out-. 
side of towns was restricted to searching the known or suspected loca-
tions of enemy headquarters. 
i. By the time Operation Husky came to an end, it was evident 
that the various G-2's had come to rely very heavily upon Counter In-
telligence Corps personnel and that there very definitely was a Counter 
Intelligence Corps mission with tactical units in such operations. 
This was a tribute to an organization that learned its lesson quickly 
on the battlefield. 
21. OPERATICl'I IN THE STATIC S ITUATICl'I. The rapid advance of 
United Statesforc~s in Sicily made the change-over of counterintel-
ligence control of towns and areas from one team ~o another extremely 
difficult. It was the procedure of division sections to·remain with 
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"'cir divisions even though the division passed quickly through a tOlfJl • 
. .. is gave the section little opportunity to do effective work in the 
town. Often elements of the corps section were late in arriving or 
failed to arrive until after the division section had left. Even at 
best, there existed a continual change-over from division to corps to 
army sections, which caused considerable confusion to all concerned 
and much duplication of work on the part of the detachment •• 
a. With the cessation of hostilities and the definition of 
defense areas, Counter Intelligence Corps sections reverted to the 
static type of Counter Intelligence Corps work, involving civil as 
well as military counterintelligence. Later, however, four Port De- . 
tachments were combined to form a permanent static group for the 
American half of Sicily. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments with 
tactical units thereupon turned over their civilian files and civil 
security responsibility to the new group and devoted themselves 
exclusively to military security matters. 
b. The static group undertook more elaborate security precau-
tions and surveys than the tactical sections had. Personnel were 
divided on a territorial basis within the four Western provinces. In 
each of these provinces, a Counter Intelligence Corps office was estab- . 
lished with the responsibility for all Counter Intelligence Corps . 
activity in the province. For convenience the offices were located at 
the provincial capitals, with small sub-offices at smaller cities. 
This administrative set-up provided a fi~ basis for effective counter-
:ntelligence coverage of the areas and expedited the transmission to 
Theater Headquarters of the information obtaine~. 
c. In addition, surveys of vital military and civilian in-
stallations were made for organizations responsible for their security. 
Liaison was established with the intelligence officers and Counter In-
telligence Corps section of the tactical units located in the areas, 
with a view toward coordinating activities, effecting a mutual exchange 
. of information, and providing for common assistance. Coordination of, . 
activities with those of AMG was maintained. Investigations of purely: 
political matters or other matters falling within the jurisdiction of 
AMG were undertaken only upon the request of that organization. In 
general, close liaison with the Military Police, local police, al!d 
other enforcement agencies was established; and informants were'· 
developed and cultivated. 
22. OCCUPATIOOAL PHASE BEG1NS. In the occupation of Sicily the' 
Counter Intelligence Corps had complete freedom of action within its 
jurisdiction. It was found necessary to have agents in every major 
town secure information on political activity of every description. 
Every effort was made to effect complete liaison of the Seventh Army 
Counter Intelligence Corps with all other detachments at all times; and· 
care was taken to provide for immediate reversion to the tactical 
situation, should such a contingency arise. Furthermore, Counter In-
telligence Corps personnel of port detachments were placed within easy 
. reach of each. other and in continual operation. Complete coverage of 
the occupied areas followed a definite pattern. ., 
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a. In the cities of Sicily the Counter Intelligence Corps set 
up local Counter Intelligence Corps headquarters, if only for a tem-
porary period, where friendly persons could come to give information. 
Usually these offices were plainly marked "COUNTER lNTELLIGENCE CORPS," 
and officials were advised where to direct those desiring to talk to 
its personnel. Contacts among the friendly elements of the population 
were establiShed for possible use as informants, and the names of 
suspects thus received were checked and double-checked against other 
informants. Persons found to be dangerous were confined. In many in-
stances the Parish Priest was found to be the most valuable source of 
information. 
b. The maj or effort of the Counter Intelligence Corps was 
made in captured towns. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel restored 
order; secured documents, critical installations, and supplies; arrested 
leading Fascists; and investigated the civil administrators. AMGOT 
officers were kept informed of the political situation, and replace-
ments were recommended for officials arrested. 'During the interim be-
tween capture by combat troops and the taking over of the communi ties 
by AMGOT personnel, many civil problems related to security were met. 
c. By 1 August, The Counter Intell igence Corps had taken more 
than 500 poll tical prisoners, among whom were members, of the OVRA 
(Opera Vol una tria Repressioni Anti-Fascismo), the Squadra DiAzione (the 
strong-arm men of the Fascist Party notorious for their "castor-oil 
treatment" of anti-Fascists), and members of the other numerous Fascist 
organizations. Fascist officers and leaders who had fled from the 
larger cities returned, and many of these returnees were recognized 
from captured documents. Arrests continued daily. . 
23. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS. Division Counter Intelligence Corps 
sections were charged with the securing of captured documents. Daily 
reports of immediate value to the division Assistant Chief of Staff, 
G-2, were submitted. These contained descriptions of roads beyond the 
enemy lines, information on enemy concentrations, state of enemy morale, 
locations of enemy mine fields and road blocks, and detailed data con-
cerning enemy strength, disposition, and movement. 
a. Included in the information culled from the documents 
captured were copies of the order of battle of enemy units operating in 
SiCily and in the Balkans. Complete records of the prison system con-
trolled by the Italian Prisoner of War Group and their informant system 
were uncovered, as well as the location of all prisoner of war camps 
in Sicily and Italy. Invaluable information was obtained also from 
impounded mails by the Seventh Army G-2. 
b. Document collection was left largely to other intelligence ' 
agencies due to lack of transportation for the Counter Intelligence ' 
Corps detachments. Only the lstDivision, which had additional G-2 
personnel to use for the purpose of securing these documents, produced 
outstanding results. In somd instances, the II Corps Detachment was 
able to secure valuable material left by the hastily withdrawn enemy. 
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24. LESS(lIlS LEARNED TBHOUGH FllilD EXPEHIENCE. One of the gravest 
problems wns a lack of sufficient Italian-speaking Counter Intelligence 
rorps personnel; and though many attempts were made to adjust it, none 
JS satisfactory. In some cases local civilians were pressed into 
service as interpreters with the help of the Carabinieri. In other 
cases soldier interpreters were secured from replacement depots, and 
since the linguistic and intellectual standards of the latter group 
were unsatisfactory, many had to be returned. 
a. A lack of proper transportation and equipment was also 
noted. Without transportation on hand when needed, a detachment was 
handicapped in accomplishing its mission, and many regions remained 
wi thout proper Counter Intelligence Corps coverage. Some provis ion 
was found to be necessary whereby this equipment could be procured 
inunediately after the initial assault. 
b. Often, much time was taken in doing AMG work prior to the 
appearance of AMG representatives in cities and towns. This was highly . 
necessary, but was performed by the Counter Intelligence Corps in . 
emergency situations and at the expense of its own work. Further, 
there was the tendency of some G-2's to employ Counter Intelligence 
Corps personnel on combat intelligence missions having no bearing on 
security. Because of the shortage of specially qualified personnel, 
G-2's should have allowed their Counter Intelligence Corps sections to 
concentrate on their security functions and not hinder them with 
missions which had no connection with their specialized field. This 
condition was further aggravated by the nebulous line of demarkation 
between the responsibilities of AMGOT and our Military Police, local 
nilitary commanders, and the Counter Intelligence Corps. To offset 
some of these problems, it was recommended that a liaison officer of 
AMG accompany the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment in the initial 
occupa tion. 
c. A recommendation was made to the effect that the command-
ing officer of the highest Counter Intelligence Corps echelon engaged 
.in an operation coordinate the activities of all sections attached to 
lower echelons. He ~hould supply lower sections with personnel from his 
section who would enter towns in the process of capture and remain there 
semi-permanently to afford Counter Intelligence Corps coverage. Such: a 
plan would have eliminated to a large extent the mUltiple transfer of . 
Counter Intelligence Corps control and duplication of effort. 
d. It was recommended that a large pool of Counter Intelli-
gence Corps operatives be retained under the control of the theater 
conunander, with a small detachment in each division. In some cases no . 
other operatives were available when division Counter Intelligence 
Corps left an area, and it became necessary for later arrivals to do 
again much of the work of gaining contact. with informants. 
e. An outstanding contribution to Counter Intelligence Corps 
activities in Sicily was the employment of United States buttons rather 
than insignia of rank by Counter Intelligence Corps person,nel. This 
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was a decided step forward from the North African campaign where agents 
wore the insignia of rank and, as a result, the task of enlisted per-
sonnel in dealing with Allied officers was rendered difficul t • 
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CHAPTER 6 
OPERATlcrlS IN ITALY 
25. PRE- IN VAS l<l'l PLANNING. By July, 1943, Operation Avalanche 
(Italian) was in the planning stage, and Fifth Army Counter Intelligence 
Corps was assigned the operational counterintelligence phase. This was 
a notable departure from the situation prior to the North African land-
ings where the Counter Intelligence Corps was completely in the dark 
even as to where it was going. A heavy cut in supply personnel for 
Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps during the Sicilian operation was 
necessitated by the demands of Fifth Army for personnel to do border 
control work after Fifth Army left North Africa. The Counter Intelli-
gence Corps detachment that accompanied the Fifth Army to Italy had a 
strength of 27: 5 officers and 22 enlisted men. 
26. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DURING TIlE INVASION. The 36th Divi-
sion Counter Intelligence Corps and VI Corps Counter Intelligence Corps 
landed in Italy on D-Day. The bulk of the Fifth Army Detachment em-
barked for Italy at Oran on 1 September, leaving a small rear echelon 
behind to bring on transportation and other equipment which could not 
be lifted in the early convoys. The Detachment landed on 11 September 
(D plus 2) near Paestum on the Salerno Beachhead under heavy enemy fire. 
a. For the first week after the landing, the tactical situa-
tion was very fluid. At one point there was serious danger that the 
'lfth Army would be thrown off the beaChhead by vigorous German counter-
attacks. The area covered was very small and sparsely settled, further 
limiting Counter Intelligence Corps operations durin'g this phase. The '. 
Army Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment lived in foxholes during 
this period. Shortly after the landing, detachments of the 3rd Divi-
sion, 34th DiviSion, and the 45th Division received indoctrination 
from the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps. 
b. The general atmosphere at this time was one of uncertainty. 
On one occasion a German attack almost captured the Army Advance Command 
Post, and Army Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were placed in the 
line to defend it. On another occasion a group of Army Counter Intelli-
gence Corps personnel were surrounded and cut off by German tanks while 
attempting to enter the town of Battipaglia to conduct preliminary 
security work there. They escaped and ultimately reached the town only" . 
to find it completely evacuated and destroyed. 
c. On 14 September a group of Army Counter Intelligence Corps 
and British Counter Intelligence Section (FSS) personnel went to the 
Sorrento Peninsula to handle counterintelligence work with the Rangers 
there. A number of arrests of consequence were made, including prom-
inent Fasci.sts who had been signaling information to the enemy. A small 
detachment was also sent to cover the adjacent islands of Capri, Ischia, 
and Procida, from which enemy agents were infiltrating Allied territory. 
During this entire period the .Counter Intelligence Corps supplied the 
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Army G-2 with combat intelligence since the Office of Strate\lic Services 
. espionage services were not yet operating. 
d. On 1 October Naples fell, and the Army Counter Intelligence 
Corps moved in with advance elements of the B2nd Airborne Division. For 
three weeks the 305tH Counter Intell igence Corps Detachment (Fifth Army 
Detachment) was in charge of counterintelligence in that city. Naples 
was the largest which had ever been handled by a Counter Intelligence 
Corps detachment anywhere in the world up to that time.. Important 
documents and material were obtained from German espionage agents and 
their headquarters. A number of important security arrests were made, 
including several Italian generals who had gone underground. On 24 
October, counterintelligence jurisdiction over Naples was turned over 
to the Counter Intelligence Corps (Peninsular Base Section), and the 
,Fifth Army Detachment moved to Caserta. 
27. FROM THE VOLTURNO RIVER TO ROME. After the fall of Naples the 
long static period begun, centering around the seige of Cassino which 
was highlighted by the landing at Anzio in January, 1944. During this 
period the Army Counter Intelligence Corps began the work of security 
. coverage. The Army area was divided into zones with a squad of Counter 
Intelligence Corps agents responsible for each zone. Security surveys 
of every town of consequence were prepared, and important Fascists and 
other security suspects were arrested and interned. 
a. At this time the work of the Counter Intelligence Corps 
was of a countersubversive nature directed against post-occupational 
enemy agents. From this standpoint this work was carried on success-
fully, since the arrest and internment of key Fascist figures removed 
points around which subversive groups might form. The absence of sub-
versive activity during the campaign was attriuutable to the Counter 
Intelligence Corps. 
b. During the period Octouer to December, 1943, Army Counter 
Intelliuence Corps was reinforced by the II Corps' Counter Intelligence 
Corps and 1st Armored Division Counter Intelligence Corps in addition 
to French nnd English counterintelligence personnel. 
c. In December, 1943, an event occurred to ease the personnel 
situation. An Italian counterespionage organization SD1 CS (SicurezzQ 
Informazione Militare, Contro-Spionaggio) was attached to the Fifth 
Army and placed under the operational direction of the Fifth Army 
Counter Intelligence Corps. This unit proved itself invaluable in the 
conduct of undercover counterintelligence missions which would have 
been practically impossible for the Counter Intelligence Corps to 
accomplish. This unit averaged about 50 men, of whom 30 operated with 
Army Counter Intelligence Corps. The others were deployed with the 
Corps and Division Counter Intelligence Corps detachments. 
d. A maj or development in the operations of the Counter In-
telligence Corps was the establishment in December of the Fifth Army 
Refugee Interro\jation Post. ,1'he principal task' of this new organization 
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was the interrogation of civilian suspects who had not been identified 
as enemy agents by the arresting units. Some 40 enemy agents were 
4etected by the Refugee Interrogation Post which, through continuous 
.aterrogation, had acquired exceptional knowledge of the many German 
Intelligence Service organizations in Italy, their personalities, and 
set-ups. The work of the Fifth Army Refugee Interrogation Post 
received many commendations from Allied intelligence authorities in 
this theater. 
e. During the winter of 1943-1944, Counter Intelligence Corps 
activities centered around Naples and the beachhead at Anzio. Continual 
liaison was maintained with detachments in Sicily, and from time to 
time various members of the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps De-
tachment were dispatched to the beachhead for varying· periods of duty. 
At Anzio, these agents handled the 'Cases of two enemy saboteurs apprehend- . 
ed there and provided for the security of the advance Army Command Post. 
f. In the early part of April, 1944, Army Counter Intelligence 
Corps moved from Caserta to Sparanise where the Counter Intelligence 
Corps sub-sections were also deployed around the Army area to provide 
area coverage. Here a system of civilian control was introduced which 
later culminated in successful counterintelligence activities. 
Carabinieri road blocks were established throughout the area. Coast-
watching posts were established to supervise all landings. Counter In-
telligence Corps screening units also were set up at the A~~ Refugee 
Camps. Persons registering at hotels or boarding houses in towns 
throughout the area were subject to investigation, as were persons 
obtaining new identity cards or ration cards. Spot checks were made of 
;trangers, and roving patrols of countersabotage or Counter Intelligence 
Corps personnel supplemented the stationary Carabinieri check-posts 
along the highways, This control system grew as Counter Intelligence 
Corps experience gradually increased. 
g. On 24 May, 1944, most of the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence 
Corps Detachment joined the Rome .. s .. Force at a concentration area near 
Naples, leaving behind only a skeleton force to cover the Army area 
during their absence.· The purpose of the "s" Force was to enter the 
city with the first troops and provide immediate intelligence and 
counterintelligence action against personality and building targets. 
The security personnel consisted of about 100, of whom 50 were American· 
" . Counter Intelligence Corps personnel (from Fifth Army Counter Intelli-
gence Corps, Counter Intelligence Corps Peninsular Base Section, and 
Counter Intelligence Corps Combat Advance Section, and the Counter In- . 
telligence Corps Detachment newly organized to handle Rome after its 
capture), 'and the remaining 50 were British Field Security personnel. 
All of the security personnel were placed under Fifth Army Counter In-
telligence Corps direction. 
h. The ' .. s .. Force moved to Anzio by boat at the end of May and 
entered Rome on SChedule on the night of 4-5 June. During the first 
15 days in Rome, its Counter Intelligence Corps and FSS personnel seized 
a vast amount of important intelligence and counterintelligence documents 
and apprehended a considerable number of known'enemy agents. Counter 
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Intelligence Corps personnel with this Force received written commenda-
tion froOl the .. s .. Force commander for their work. On 17 June, the 
Counter Intelligence Corps, Fifth ArOlY, left "s" Force, Oloving to 
Tuscania where it resuOled its norOlal functions. 
28. ADMINISTI!ATIVE PROCEDUllliS DUl!ING THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN. The 
success of the Counter Intelligence Corps was due in part to adOlinistra-
tive changes that had taken place as a result of recommendations made 
by conscientious detachment commanders. As the Fifth Army extended its, 
lines, Counter Intelligence Corps jurisdictions in the occupied areas 
were expanded to meet the exigencies of the new situations. With the 
Army north of Naples in November, 1943, were the Counter Intelligence 
Corps sections attached to Fifth Army, II Corps, VI Corps, 3rd Infantry 
Division, 34th Infantry Division, 36th Infantry Division, 45th Infantry 
Division, and 1st Armored Division. In Sicily, Counter Intelligence 
Corps detachments were attached to the Seventh Army, 9th Infantry Divi-
sion, and 2nd Armored Division. These units were expected to depart 
from this theater for the European Theater of Operations at any time. 
The 1st Infantry Division had already departed. Counter Intelligence 
Corps personnel formerly attached to the Fifteenth Army Group were now 
part of the Counter Intelligence Corps Section, Insular Base Section. 
They afforded Counter Intelligence Corps static coverage for the four 
Western provinces in Sicily which were under American control. The 
Fifth Army Base Section was redesignated Peninsular Base Section with 
jurisdiction extending southeast from the rear boundary of the Fifth 
Army and covering the Western portion of Southern Italy. With the 
advance of the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps, control of the 
, Naples area was taken over by the Counter Intelligence Corps Section, 
Peninsular Base Section. 
a. The Counter Intelligence Corps Peninsular Base Section was 
organized to cover the largest amount of territory of any detachment in 
Italy. Territorial jurisdiction extended from Naples to Pisa with the 
exclusion of the City of Rome. Counter Intelligence Corps Peninsular 
Base Section maintained a sub-section at Rome to handle Peninsular Base 
Section territory immediately north and south of Rome province. 
Al though the area extended inland only to an average of 25 miles, the 
security responsibility was actually doubled, for in addition to land 
side there were 300 miles of coast line which presented a constant 
threat to sec uri ty. In emergencies Counter Intelligence Corps Peninsular 
Base Section was set up to relieve the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence 
Corps in case new tactical situations created new counterintelligence 
obligations for them. Close cooperation and liaison was maintained at' 
all times between the two sections. 
b. In May, 1944, under authority of T/O&E 30-500, the Fifth 
'Army Counter Intelligence Corps was reorganized into th,ree separate 
Provisional Detachments which continued to operate as a single unit, 
since the senior detachment commander of the Fifth Army Counter Intelli-
gence Corps Detachment had administrative supervision over all three 
detachments. ,In addition, it provided for coaunisSion vacancies and 
opportuni ties for grade promotions. 
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29. FROM ROME TO TlIE ARNO RIVER. On 19 July, one provisional de-
tachment entered the city of Leghorn (Livorno) as part of an "S" Force 
similar to that which entered Rome. This "S" Force was small and com-
pact. Little of counte~intelligence interest developed, since the town 
was a virtual ghost-town, largely evacuated, and heavily mined through-
out the center. At the end of August, Army Counter Intelligence Corps 
Headquarters moved to Tavernelle where it was to remain until the end 
of December. Early in September, Army Counter Intelligence sub-
detachments entered Pisa and later Lucca with the assault troops which 
took those cities. Neither city was considered large enough for a 
regular "S" Force, but Army Counter Intelligence Corps performed the 
same function as an .. s .. Force would have done, in addition to estab-
lishing regular security coverage of these cities. 
30. THE GERMAN ESPIONAGE .PROBLEM. The drive from Rome to the 
Arno River was too rapid to permit effective counterintelligence. It 
was possible only to skim the surface in order to move along with the 
troops. Because of the few captures of enemy agents, there was actually 
a dearth of information about the German Intelligence Service (GIS) in 
Italy. Little was learned concerning its methods and techniques, and 
without this information it was extremely difficult to capture German 
agents. However, the enemy also was hungry for some intelligence 
concerning Allied plans and operations, since it was evident to him 
that the Allied advance would steam roller through the Italian peninsula. 
To obtain this information he decided to dispatch trained agents behind 
the Allied lines. 
a. Beginning October, 1944, a mass assault of German espionage 
and sabotage agents on the Fifth Army area·began. Some were parachuted 
in, some landed by boat on the coast, but the maj ori ty were line-
crossers, most of whom ent,ered the Fifth Army area in the thinly held 
Western sector. 
b. Fortunately, by this time the Counter Intelligence Corps 
had tightened its system of controls and was constantly improving the 
system. Dr. Koni, the German officer in charge of Abwehr Komrnando 190, 
which ran large numbers of espionage agents into the Fifth Army area 
confessed after capture that not a single one of his agents had re~ 
turned between October, 1944, and January, 1945. Similar admissions 
were made by other captured German officials. 
c. From October, .1944, to April, 1945, a total of 200 trained· 
enemy agents were captured in Fifth Army areas, an average of over one 
a day. The Counter Intelligence Corps represented less than half of 
the operational counterintelligence personnel in that area. The 
excellent control systems of the 92nd Division and IV Corps Counter In-
telligence Corps made the capture of a great many of these agents 
pOSSible, and those that filtered through were frequently caught by 
the Army Counter Intelligence Corps, In addition, the Army Counter In-
telligence Corps was able to ferret out a number of post-occupation 
espionage agents, some of whom had built up good cover stories. In-
terrogation of enemy agents captured by the 305th Counter Intelligence 
.. . 
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Corps Detachment made possible the capture of a cons iderable number of 
ether agents outside the 305th's area by other counterintelligence 
agencies. 
d. After the initial assault the German Intelligence Service 
was forced to rely on emergency measures to recruit new agents to re-
place those who had not returned, In Northern Italy the Abwellr opened 
several spy schools, recruiting poor peasants, black-market operators, 
Fascists, and former officers of the Italian Air Force and Navy, Their 
recruits ranged from twelve-year old boys to middle-aged men and women. 
There was even a half-wit, an innocent soul who agreed to cross the 
lines for two dollars in Italian lire, These recruits were given a 
short three-week course in espionage and sabotage and then dispatched 
to the front lines to do their work. They sought quantity rather than'. 
quali ty. The German pattern became so methodical and exact that the 
'American Counter Intelligence Corps stood in wait for these agents to 
cross the lines. 
e. American Counter Intelligence Corps agents, through their 
personal interrogation of captured enemy agents, had become familiar 
with the complicated German Intelligence Service's Italian set-up and 
with those characteristics which distinguished its agents. 
f. To insure counterintelligence coverage, the 85th Division 
provided for a Counter Intelligence Corps team to accompany each regi-
mental combat team. Since the troops of tllis Division were occupying 
areas already covered by sub-sections of the IV Corps and Fifth Army 
Counter Intelligence Corps, its Counter Intelligence Corps detachment 
established liaison with those Counter Intelligence Corps units already 
in the area. Emphasis was placed on the importance of apprehending all 
suspicious or unidentifiable persons for questioning by the Counter 
Intelligence Corps. Due to the continual advance into enemy territory, 
and because of the frequent replacements of personnel in Divisions, it 
was necessary to provide the combat troops with constant training in 
security an~ to reemphasize the basic rules of security and how they 
were related to the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps. 
g. In late December the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps 
Headquarters moved from Tavernelle to Campi Bisenzio effecting little 
change in the area of coverage since the various detachments were pro-
viding coverage for one another in most areas. 
31. THE FINAL BREAKTHROUGH. By mid-April the Fifth Army Counter 
'Intelligence Corps was ready to perform its usual "s" Force mission in 
the major cities along the line of advance, On the 21st Bologna fell, 
and the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps entered the city as the 
"s" Force. During the first four days of intensive activity. numerous 
persons of security interest, as well as German Intelligence Service 
officials, were apprehended. After five days in which the Counter In-
. telligence Corps had been engaged in handling these captured enemy 
agents and officials, as well as effecting the capture of valuable in-
telliuence documents, the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps moved 
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to Verona, the headquarters of the German Intelligence Service in Italy. 
Thereafter the Germans retreated rapidly out of Italy. and on<1z May, the 
war in Italy came to an end. This, however, did not terminate the 
activities of the Counter, Intelligence Corps which continued to seek out 
the German Intelligence Service officials who had gone into hiding. 
32. LESSOOS LEARNED 00 THE BASIS OF FmLD EXPERmNCE. Under con-
ditions as they existed during the Italian campaign, where large 
· sections of the population were prO-Allied, it was possible and often 
, necessary to use the services of natives to infiltrate through enemy 
lines in order to obtain information concerning the military situation 
of the enemy. To be assured of the intentions of these agents it was 
necessary to establish and improve informant nets. This was one of the 
outstanding aChievements of the Peninsular Base Section whose General 
Investigative Squad had, by early November, 1943. reached a point in 
the cultivation of their confidential informants, where they could be 
checked against each other as a means of evaluating their information. 
a. Another important achievement of the Peninsular Base 
· Section was the establishment of ·the Allied Identification Center <AIC) 
in the Leghorn area. It was evident to the Counter Intelligence Corps 
that an organization such as the Allied Identification Center was 
necessary in order to expedite the screening of all persons seeking 
employment with Allied installations and those requesting food ration 
cards, replacement of identity documents, and port passes. The supervi-
sion of the Allied Identification Center and its personnel consisted of 
two Counter Intelligence Corps agents. The Allied Identification Center 
handled approximately 200 applications daily, and the name and descrip-
tion of each applicant was checked against the suspect file. The . 
Fascist records of Livorno were also checked, after which persons were· 
interrogated briefly by a Counter Intelligence Corps agent or an FSP. 
The creation of this organization resulted in an economy of security 
personnel needed for other duties, and.it met the exigency created by 
.. the great demand for labor in the area. 
b. It became a standing operating procedure for the Army 
- Counter Intelligence Corps to move ahead of Corps and Division Counter 
· Intelligence Corps to perform the initial counterintelligence work when 
large cities were captured. This was desirable because of the larger 
size of the Army Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment and its greater 
experience in handling large population centers. 
c. The importance of liaison was the prinCipal lesson learned 
in Sicily, and it was continually improved in Italy. Here, there was 
an increasingly wider dissemination of information among detachments as 
well as among other Allied operational counterintelligence units. This 
speeded up the flow of information that otherwise would have gone slowly 
through echelons of command. Close liaison was maintained with the 
Office of Strategic Services and with the American Military Government. 
Generally speaking, Military Government in Italy cooperated more closely 
with the Counter Intelligence Corps than had been the case in Sicily. 
By the end of 1943 the Peninsular Base Section Counter Intelligence 
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Corps Detachment had its own sub-section placed with AMG at the latter's 
request to investigate present and potential office holders. 
d. In view of the fact that there was an increasing associa-
tion between the Counter Intelligence Corps and the American Military 
Government, as well as other Allied intelligence agencies, a detailed 
knowledge was necessary on the part of Counter Intelligence Corps 
personnel of the structure, problems, and methods of operation of these 
organizations..It was felt that a preCise knowledge of these details 
would considerably increase the ability and confidence of the agent and 
minimize the operational inefficiency caused by the necessity of 
training new Counter Intelligence Corps agents in local fundamentals~ 
Moreover, it was recommended that an increased emphasis be placed on 
the laws of evidence and that Counter Intelligence Corps personnel be 
instructed in the procedure of Allied Military Courts. When suspected 
enemy agents or security violators were brought to trial, Counter In-
telligence Corps agents could be thoroughly prepared to present their 
points clearly, and results could be speedily accomplished. 
e. To bring about an effective system of controls it was 
necessary to coordinate the activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps 
detachments. This could be expedited by the flow of information from 
one detachment to another. Prior to October, 1944, this had not pre· 
sented too great a problem; but after the mass assault by the German 
Intelligence Service, the situation became extremely dangerous unless 
each detachment kept abreast of what was happening. To be effective 
the information had to be easily accessible and presented in a con-
venient form. It was necessary to get information into the hands of 
the people who were operating on the ground. One of the devices used 
in the dissemination of information was the "Patterns Report" devised 
by the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment and widely 
adopted by other Allied agencies. It was simply a Modus Operandi of 
enemy agents. This was considered of such import that many detachments 
recommended that Counter Intelligence Corps agents be thoroughly 
schooled in t!le patterns of behavior of enemy agents. 
f. The Counter Intelligence Corps was quick to learn that, 
unless some uniformity of plans and operations was adopted,many of 
its successes might be neutralized. This was clear especially in the 
issuance of passes to Italians. Passes were issued by various organiza-
tions to such an extent that it became practically impossible to de-
termine their authenticity. Many of these passes were issued by 
numerous Italian officials in different forms so that it became an 
easy matter for enemy agents to obtain them. This procedure was altered 
because of the efforts of some vigilant detachment commanders who re-
commended that a standard form be used which would be recognized by 
Allied military and security personnel. 
g. On the basis of field experience, many other recommenda-
tions were made by the various Counter Intelligence Corps detachment 
commanders, and while it was possible to follow the advIce of some, it 
was impossible to carry them all out. • . 
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CHAPTER 7 
OPERATlOOS IN TIlE UNITED KINGDOM 
33. ORGANIZATION. In June, 1942, the United Kingdom was divided 
into four base sections: Southern, Eastern, Western, and North Ireland, 
with London exempted from such control. Base Section boundaries were 
made to coincide with the boundaries of the British home "Commands" in 
order to effect closer coordination between British and American forces. 
North Ireland Base Section was the scene of the original staging area 
for American Forces in the spring of 1942; then it became inactive 
except as an air ferry base in 1943, but became the scene of a secondary 
troop concentration in late 1943 and early 1944. 
a. When organized, each Base Section was allotted an intelli-
gence officer, per Army Regulations and European Theater of Operations, 
United States Army order, but the position was not made of general staff 
rank until the spring of 1943. Moreover, the Counter Intelligence Corps 
organization in this theater had been neglected for some time. The . 
office of the detachment commander was not current on the Counter In-
telligence Corps directives which had been issued. Each detachment had 
been left to shift for itself without coordination, and the situation 
became so confused that the office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence 
Corps, European Theater of Operations, from time to time did not know 
where the detachments were. However, by late November every organiza-
tion in the theater was devoting most of its energies to reorganization' 
and preparation for future operations. 
b. In the port areas the Counter Intelligence Corps detach-
ments worked operationally under the Port Intelligence Officer in the 
same manner as the Base Section detachments worked operationally under 
the G-2's of the Base Section, but their reports and administration 
were handled through the Base Sections in which the port areas were 
. located. Personnel in the port areas met incoming ships and mingled 
with the crews to pick up any disaffection which might have been 
apparent. They gave security lectures to incoming crews and, in some 
instances, to the officers. In the main, the value of the work per- . 
formed was to be found in the training which Counter Intelligence Corps 
personnel received in port security work which they would later have 
to perform. 
34. LIAISCX'] WITH BRITISH INTELLIGENCE. The ultimate responsiJil-
ity for counterintelligence in this theater rested with the British and 
their civilian organizations, supplemented in some instances by the 
'military, and they were well set up to handle it. The Counter Intelli-
gence Corps, in its work, confined itself to matters relating directly 
to United States military personnel and was particularly careful to 
avoid any intrusion into British jurisdiction. Except for local 
. instances· of cooperation, there was little joint work with the British. 
Liaison was maintained with Scotland Yard at all times as an important 
part of the. investigative work that was carried on. However, tbe 
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greatest handicap suffered by all intelligence officers up to the time 
of the Normandy invasion was a lack of trained personnel. By 25 May 
1944, there were approximately 800 agents and 100 officers available 
for duty. 
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CHAPTER 8 
OPEMTI<l'lS IN FRANCE AND TIlE LO'ILANDS 
35. PIill-lNVASION PLANNlNG. Starting in early spring, 1944, 
amphibious exercises on varying scales were held generally on the 
Southern coast of England. These exercises served a dual purpose. They 
enabled all personnel to profit from the experience gained in "dry runs." 
, They also served a security purpose, for exercises were soon regarded 
as an accepted affair. Deficiencies in the security system were noted 
and corrected each time an exercise was held. The final security 
procedure for Operation Overlord was largely composed of corrective 
measures submitted by the Counter Intelligence Corps agents who served 
as intelligence personnel on the staff of each camp commandant. 
a. The Counter Intelligence Branch (CIB) staff planning for 
counterintelligence coverage of mounting operations began in September, 
1943, following the first meetings of the "Overlord" Sub-committee. 
To smooth out any deficiencies which might appear in the coming opera-
tion, each Counter Intelligence Corps team was required to send in a 
separate report following an exercise, embodying all phases of security 
work within its area, with recommendations for correction. 
b. As a basis for counterintelligence planning, all First 
United States Army Group, First United States Army, and 21st British 
<\rmy Group operational plans were thoroughly studied and pertinent 
.,arts extracted for' incorporation in the Third United States Army 
Counterintelligence Plan. Monthly visits were made by counterintelli-
gence officers to London and Bristol where conferences were held on 
security problems. From these ,visits incorporating studies of available 
information, gaps in the counterintelligence plan were closed with 
definite information. 
c. According to this plan, the commander was made responsible 
for all counterintelligence within his command, and the appropriate 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was assigned the responsibility for the 
immediate direction of the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment attached 
or assigned to his unit. Stress was laid on the employment of the 
Counter Intelligence Corps to combat espionage, sabotage, and subversion; 
to prevent leakage of information to the enemy, and to deliver security, 
lectures to troops. Close liaison and cooperation was to be maintained 
among all counterintelligence agencies, Civil Affairs, and the Provost 
Marshal. 
d. In addition to normal counterintelligence duties within 
Army, Corps, and Division in the field, Counter Intelligence Corps de-
tachments were to perfonn tactical Counter Intelligence Corps functions, 
such as search of enemy command posts and the questioning of civilians, 
informers, and agents in occupied territory. The Army detachment was 
to conduct rear echelon missions including safeguarding military 
''1formation. security against the activities of enemy agents, a,nd rear 
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echelon counterintelligence functions in general. To the Corps and 
ilivision detachments were assigned the field security missions performed 
in forward eChelons. 
e. To provide continuous coverage, provisions were made for 
the reinforcement of Corps and Division detachments from the Army de-
tachment pool as the necessity arose. Since this transfer of personnel 
might have proved difficult from an administrative standpoint, the 
plan required that Army Counter Intelligence Corps personnel revert to 
Army control as soon as the pre-determined counterintelligence objectives 
were reached. While in Corps and Divisions, Army personnel would be 
placed under command of Corps or Division Counter Intelligence Corps 
detachment commanders. If the necessity for reinforcement were to 
arise in critical areas, provision was made for the transfer of 
Counter Intelligence Corps personnel from Corps or Divison to Army 
Counter Intelligence Corps detachments pools. However, Corps and Divi-
sion detachments were not to be reduced below a strength of I officer 
and 7 enlisted men. 
f. In Sicily, it was proved that only confusion and needless 
repetition of effort resulted when Division Counter Intelligence Corps 
turned over control to Corps and then to Army, without coordination to 
provide continuous coverage. The difficulty of providing higher 
eChelons with immediate information concerning Counter Intelligence 
Corps activities in areas under Division control was not forgotten. To 
remedy this situation the plans of the 21st British Army Group, First 
United States Army, and Third United States Army contained a provision 
whereby Army CDC personnel would be place~ with division detachments 
entering a town, to remain there through the period of both Corps and 
Army control until relieved by communications zone Counter Intelligence 
Corps personnel. Similarly, a "Town Counterintelligence Plan" was 
evolved in mimeographed form to be forwarded to Divisions, Corps, and 
Army Headquarters within forty-eight hours of entry into a town. This 
not only contained information of conditions in the town and missions 
accomplished, b4t served as a check list for Counter Intelligence Corps, 
agents. 
g. In March, 1944, the recently appointed Assistant Chief of 
Staff, G-2, ETOUSA, arranged with the Third United States Army for the 
temporary release of nearly 100 Counter Intelligence Corps officers and 
agents to supplement security personnel on duty in the more and more 
congested Southern and Western Base Sections. Tile Counter Intelligence 
Corps sought to furnish all possible staff and administrative assistance 
, to the two Base Sections involved in the mounting of "Overlord." The 
headquarters from which counterintelligence functions were operationally 
controlled was the Base Section. 
36. OPERATI(lIIS WITII COMBAT TROOPS. Before dawn on D-Day, 6 June, 
1944, six Counter Intelligence Corps detachments had landed in Normandy. 
Officers and agents of the lOlst and 82nd Airborne Divis'ion came by 
parachute or glider along with the first troops of their Divisions. 
Other detachmenta JIIIlde the amphibious landing with assault. troops, of 
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the 1st, 4th, 9th, and 29th Infantry Divisions. Within a week the 
r;ounter Intelligence Corps detachments of the 2nd and 90th Infantry Divi-
sions were also ashore, along with those from V, VII, and VIII Corps 
elements of the First United States Army Detachment. An advance party 
of the 9th Air Force Detachment was supported by reserve units from the 
Twelfth United States Army Group. Several port teams were assigned to 
the forward echelon (advance section) of the Communications Zone. 
a. On D-Day the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps De-
tachments was clear and concise: to locate, seize, and place under 
guard all important communications centers and to take charge of civil-
ian traffic control. The extent to which the teams had been briefed 
for the mission varied. Some Divisions provided every member of the 
detachment with maps, indicating targets and lists of persons to be 
arrested, and other Divisions entrusted only the commanding officer of 
the detachment with this information. Wherever possible, these detach-
ments established contact with, and made use of, resistance groups. 
b. Aided by this service, some of the detachments moved for~ 
ward almost immediately after the landing. As each new town or village 
was taken, Counter Intelligence Corps agents rushed to communication 
centers to make certain that telephonic, telegraphic, and radio com-
.munications had been stopped, and impounded mail in the post offices. 
Cherbourg, the first major counterintelligence target, was entered on 
27 June, 1944, by elements of the 4th Infantry Division Counter Intel-
ligence Corps. Documents captured in this city were so voluminous that. 
they were turned over to the VII Corps Order of Battle Team for evalua-' 
tion and dissemination. Each phase of this work was handled with com-
parative ease in June and July when the advance was slow, but with the 
breakthrough in August and September, resulting in the rapid liberation 
of large numbers of villages iii a single day, it was impossible to do 
more than to skim the surface. 
c. With a Division in combat, Counter Intelligence Corps 
duties also included security surveys and screening of all civilians who 
were overtaken by the Allied advance, or who later made their w<lY back 
through German lines into Allied territory. An increasing number of ; 
TODT workers and other categories of impressed labor were encountered 
who further complicated counterintelligence problems. Individual 
Counter Intelligence Corps teams spent much time in interrogating 
hundreds of civilians who were sent to the Division Civilian Cage • 
. Every precaution was taken to apprehend and question German deserters 
in civi11an clothing. 
d. Other duties of the Counter Intelligence Corps were to 
locate the offices of various German Army units and French collabora-
tionist organizations. From a security standpoint it was of extreme 
importance to seize all records for delivery to the G-2; to stop any 
and all publications; to safeguard vital installations and records 1n 
gendarmeries; and to arrest persons whose names appeared on Black . 
Lists. This latter duty was made considerably more simple in !,<onnandy 
by the thoroughness of resistance groups who, by the time tfie Counter 
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Intelligence Corps arrived, had usually arrested all collaborationists 
who did not withdraw with the Germans. These groups of Maquis were 
recognized as members of the FFI and they were generally permitted to 
retain the arms theY,carried. 
e.From the vast number of persons arrested by the United 
States Army and by French groups, it was the task of the Counter Intel-
ligence Corps to isolate those of a real counterintelligence interest. 
These persons were subjected to an intensive interrogation and, where 
it was deemed advisable, they were transferred to the United Kingdom 
where the most thorough interrogation could be given at the Office of 
Strategic Services Camp. From these interrogations a great deal was 
learned about German schools for saboteurs and spies in France; German 
plans for sabotage and espionage before and after occupation; and the . 
. locations of sabotage dumps and rendezvous points for enemy agents. 
This led to the location and seizure of secret stocks of sabotage 
material and the arrest of other agents and persons incriminated thereby. 
Furthermore, such questioning resulted in lists of students and in-
structors at sabotage schools. -
f. Every phase of Counter Intelligence Corps activity was 
closely coordinated to preclude overlapping' jurisdiction. Close 
coordination existed between the counterintelligence staffs and Counter 
Intelligence Corps personnel of the Air Force. For example, the Air 
Force Counter Intelligence Corps was responsible for the immediate 
security of the air fields. All cases involving investigation of 
civilians outside of air field areas were turned over to the ground 
force Counter Intelligence Corps detachment having area jurisdiction. 
In addition, Air Corps Counter Intelligence Corps set up certain 
definite procedures for close supervision of air travelers to and from 
the liberated areas. 
37. OPERATIONS IN NORMANDY. Liaison was maintained at all times 
'with Military Government and local authorities throughout Normandy. 
Splendid cooperation was received from the mayors, the police, and 
local resistance groups. Information from reputable groups was more 
reliable than that of the independent informant who invariably appeared 
in every village to volunteer information against neighbors. 
a. Since the activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps 
were a continuous duty which did not end with each phase of the advance, 
it was necessary to maintain a strict policy of continuous coverage in 
each area. An effort was made to maintain continuity of counterintelli-
gence application in specifi~ localities by having agents from the Corps 
detachments go ahead on loan with Division detachments, or by having 
agents with Division detachments remain behind with Corps detachments. 
The same sort of exchange was effected between Corps' and Army and be-
tween Army and Army Groups. Moreover, lower echelon teams left behind 
records of informants, suspects arrested, and,cases investigated for 
the use of the teams which relieved them. Provisions for this fusion 
of effort were contained in the First United States Army Group Standing 
Operating Procedures, dated 23 June 1944. 
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b. When the allied armies and the Communications Zone head-
quarters moved east across France, Counter Intelligence Corps work in 
Normandy and Brittany was feft to teams operating under the jurisdic-
tion of the Normandy and Brittany Base Sections, and to other detach-
ments with tactical units which remained to cope with the isolated 
pockets of Germans along the Atlantic coast. As time went on, permanent 
coverage was simplified by the use of the counterintelligence Bi-weekly 
Report made up by the Army from the bi-weekly reports of each echelon. 
This was then forwarded to the Army Group for examination, and with the 
complete picture, deficiencies could be rectified immediately. 
c. In accomplishing its mission, the Counter Intelligence 
Corps overcame a number of problems, one of which was the shortage of 
. linguists and trained interrogators. A program of local procurement 
brought considerable relief, and a large number of qualified linguists 
was transferred from tactical units into the Counter Intelligence Corps. 
This reliance upon local procurement was in keeping with directives 
from Washington insisting that "special operations units" be filled 
locally from personnel on hand there. 
d. In August, 1944, the 12th Army Group Counter Intelligence 
Corps Detachment became operational. With the liberation of Paris 
imminent, a Counter Intelligence Corps team from this detachment was 
attached to the "T" Force (corresponding to the "s" Force of the Italian 
campaign) of that Army Group and entered the city on 24 August with 
the assault troops. Thereafter, Counter Intelligence Corps agents 
accompanied the "T" Forces as they swept across Europe. 
e. To ease the tremendous problems of administration created 
by the advance, the Channel Base Section was activated in September, 
1944, with headquarters at LeHavre. The Counter Intelligence Corps 
work there was put under the control of the Port Intelligence Officer. 
At this Base Section the Counter Intelligence Corps was concerned with 
port control and loyalty checks for civilian personnel. A short time 
later a similar detachment was attached to the auxiliary port of Rouen. 
38. OPERATI{lIIS IN NORTHEASTERN FRANCE, BELGIUM, LUXEAIBOURG, AND 
H~D. In the Third United States Army Area, static tactical con-
ditions during the month of September brought about a series of counter-
intelligence problems. 
a. Now for the first time since the Army had become opera-
tional, large numbers of refugees, evacuees, and impressed former German 
. laborers were encountered in the combat area. These people had been 
released by the enemy so that they would float back through the front 
lines, cause congestion, and obtain information. It was soon discovered 
that many German soldiers, left behind in the German retreat, had 
changed into civilian clothing and mingled with these people. Some of 
them had donned civilian attire as stay-behind agents, while others 
were merely stragglers in the retreat and used this means of concealing 
their identity as enemy soldiers. . 
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b. Many reports with respect to German soldiers in civilian 
clothing proved to be false, although a large number of apprehended 
soldiers admitted that they had been sent through the lines to seek in-
formation. As the Third United States Army drew closer to Germany, 
this problem became increasingly serious, and as a result 14 Camps were 
set up with a capacity of approximately 14,000. The Counter Intelli-
gence Corps handled the task of screening personnel passing through 
these camps to determine whether they were enemy agents operating in 
disguise, enemy soldiers in civilian uniforms, civilian nationals, or 
bona fide refugees. 
c. The first phase of Counter Intelligence Corps work in 
France had been the combat phase. The territory wrested from the 
Germans was tactically within Army areas, and military necessity re-
quired complete operational control by the Counter Intelligence Corps. 
The second phase was that immediately following liberation when the 
French authorities were in the process of stabilizing their control and 
when the intervention and backing of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 
frequently needed by the French, was of mutual benefit. The third 
phase of this work, which began in October, was that following the 
successful reorganization of the French Government, when the Counter 
Intelligence Corps found its duties and powers becoming more and more 
restricted to cases involving United States Army personnel. Small 
sections of France still remained in German hands, separated from the 
rest of the country by.narrow areas of French territory which fell 
under United States Army jurisdiction. A sharp contrast existed be-
tween the work of the Counter Intelligence Corps in such areas and that 
in rear areas, where the clearing of pro-German elements was practically 
completed in September. Almost 100% of· the population could be relied 
upon. 
d. In Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland, it was found that 
the best working arrangement was to permit local author! ties, after 
their loyalty had been determined by the Counter Intelligence Corps, to 
take over as soon as possible. Only in areas extending a few miles 
back from the "battle lines did the Counter Intelligence Corps desire 
a complete operational control of security.measures. Most of the 
persons on the counterintelligence Black List fled with the Germans 
or were killed or arrested by resistance groups. Those who remained 
were usually arrested by local authorities at the request of the 
Counter Intelligence Corps or turned over to local authorities as 
soon as possible after arrest and interrogation by the Counter Intelli-
gence Corps. 
e. Meanwhile, the Third United States Army advance continued 
to result in the movement of large numbers of civilians from forward 
areas to the rear. By the month of November the Counter Intelligence 
Corps was far from the realization of its primary mission; i.e., the 
neutralization of the activities of enemy intelligence. The enemy 
" policy makers and other key personnel, of the Abwehr had all withdrawn 
with the German Army. 
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f. In December the counterintelligence mission was divided 
into two phases centering around the Moselle River sector. During the 
first phase, counterintelligence agencies continued their work in 
German territory with emphasis equally divided between military and' 
civil security. There were no outstanding developments during this 
period, and the functioning of counterintelligence agencies in the 
field was greatly facilitated by excellent coordination and cooperation 
on the part of the Military Government, Military Police, and local 
indigenous police. 
g. The second phase of counterintelligence operations 
commenced when the enemy launched his counteroffensive in the Ardennes-
Eifel area on 16 December. The emphas is then reverted to the military 
security phase of counterintelligence operations. The use by the 
enemy of American uniforms and equipment in the First United States 
Army Area called for a concerted effort on the part of all counterin-
telligence agencies. 
h. The move of the Third Army to the North necessitated the 
expansion of the counterintelligence control line to include the new 
zone of operations. Constant patrolling by mobile counterintelligence 
patrols and the increasing security-consciousness of combat troops 
hampered enemy agent operations. The nearness of the enemy, coupled 
with reports of threatened infiltration of enemy agents in Allied uni-
forms and using Allied equipment, required a rigid counterintelligence 
'control comparable to control in a newly liberated area. 
i. This German breakthrough complet~ly nullified, for the 
time being, all the efforts to establish a reliable informant net. The 
threat of brutal reprisals made the situation hopeless in so far as 
informants were concerned. It also stopped all assistance from the 
citizenry in matters pertaining to'Military Government. 
39. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE. Meanwhile, the Seventh United 
States Army entered. France in mid-August through the German Mediterranean 
defenses, and was soon fighting in the Vosges Mountains and in Alsace. 
This Army, coming later under the Sixth Army Group and ETOUSA, together 
with the Base Sections which supplied it, brought Counter Intelligence 
Corps teams experienced in the campaigns of North Africa, Sicily, and 
Italy. Seventh Army Counter Intelligence Corps teams were confronted 
, with counterintelligence problems not found by First and Third Army de-
'tachments. They received a less enthusiastic reception; faced a greater, 
number of suspect persons, together with strong evidence of Nazi in-
doctrination, vestiges of subversive groups, and many native French in 
the employ of the Abwehr. 
a. The Abwehr method of recruiting agents in the occupied 
areas was usually through black-market activities. The black-market 
avenue of'approach was chosen because it established contact and rapport 
with prospective agents. It also gained the subject's confidence and • 
gratitude for extensive favors. After a subject had thus become 
thoroughly 'involved and attempted to withdraw from espionage work, be, 
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was usually made to realize be had no choice but to continue to deliver 
information. 
b. Black-listed individuals in this sector, fearing capture 
by the Americans, made their way toward Spain and Swi tzerland. To pre-
vent this and to safeguard against the penetration of enemy agents 
through these fronts, the Counter Intelligence Corps established a 
system of controls on the German-Swiss and the Franco-Spanish frontiers. 
c. Within a few weeks of the Southern D-Day, a detachment was 
dispatched from Delta Base Section at Marseilles to the Franco-Spanish 
frontier for border control work. This detachment had been preparing 
for this particular assignment, having performed similar duties along 
the border between French and Spanish Morocco. Styled as the Pyrenees 
Border Control Group, it came under the direct jurisdiction of Supreme 
Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Another Counter Intelligence 
Corps detachment with the 44th AAA Brigade was charged wi th counterin-
telligence security of the nebulous front between Southern France and 
Northern Italy, a front extending from the Mediterranean coast to the 
Swiss frontier. 
d. Control of these borders created many problems; and al-
though many sabotage and espionage agents were apprehended, some may 
have been successful in crossing the lines. So successful was the 
security control established by the VI Corps Counter Intelligence Corps 
that they were commended. By mid-September the Seventh United States 
. Army had made contact with the Third United States Army. 
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CIlAPTER 9 
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY 
40. OPERATIONS DURING TIlE ADVANCE. Counterintelligence methods in 
Germany required complete revision from those employed in friendly 
countries. Considerable time was devoted to the formulation of plans' 
for dealing with a population knowll to be hostile. 
a. The first problem was the urgent need for additional per-
sonnel. This was solved in part by creating additional Reserve Teams 
and by local procurement. The second move was the establishment of 
Counter Intelligence Corps coverage on an area basis. Instead of 
assigning the Army Reserve Teams to specific large towns, these detach-
ments were given responsibility for a section of the Army area. A 
further method of getting around the difficulty of personnel shortage 
was to use the medium of "house arrest," thereby obviating the use of 
additional men to guard suspected persons. This was simply a moral re-
straint on suspects who were advised not to leave their houses or to 
receive visitors. As soon as a person was placed under "house arrest," 
it was immediately recorded on his Military Government registration 
slip. 
b. As the advance continued, security of the troops became a 
matter of increasing concern. One of the primary security precautions 
was the prompt registration of former members of the German Army. This 
was especially true upon entry into new sectors where the military situa-
tion permitted a sufficient stay in the area. The procedure for hand-
ling former lVehrmacht members was carefully outlined in various intelli-
gence instructions. By thus keeping tabs on former German soldiers, 
in addition to the restrictions imposed by local curfews, and the 
. threat of further restrictions for violations of military directives, 
the security of the troops, troop movements, and installations was 
tightened. 
c. As the Divisions moved rapidly from one area to the next, 
a Division Counter Intelligence Corps detachment had no time to spel1d 
on lengthy investigative practices and methods. In some instances the 
Counter Intelligence Corps received the assistance of German-speaking 
personnel from the IN (interrogation of Prisoners of War), MIl (Mil'i-
tary Intelligence Interpreters), and OB (Order of Battle) Teams in the 
screening of,civilians. 
d. In some instances the daily movement of Divisions ranged 
from twenty to thirty miles. Accordingly, detachment personnel devoted 
themselves to the neutralization of communications between Allied and' 
enemy territory, the arrest of Nazis and other Germans whose presence 
in the area constituted a threat to the security of Allied operations, 
and the sealing of party buildings in order that tile records therein 
would remain intact for future use by occupational forces. 
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e. lligh-ranking party officials, SS and SO personnel, and 
other persons liable to categorical arrest, were usually found to have 
fled from the larger towns; whereas in the smaller towns, the local 
"VIP's" were usually still to be found, apparently assuming that they 
would be overlooked. In a few cases party members committed suicide--
in one case, an ortsgruPfenleiter killed his whole family prior 'to 
eliminating himself, andn another, a Kreisobmann shot himself just 
after a Counter Intelligence Corps officer had entered his home to 
make the arrest. 
f. By early April, as important counterintelligence targets 
were rapidly overrun, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel found they 
could keep pace only by directing their attention towards the highest 
priorities of work such as the security of the Armed Forces and the 
apprehension and neutralization of SD (Securi~y Service) and Abwehr 
agents. Subversive activities were limited to certain areas notably 
in the First United States Army Area. 
g. On 30 April, the 97th Counter Intelligence Corps Detach-
ment reported the capture of Colonel Krueger, former Commandant of the 
lIeeresschule Fur Sonderaufgaben, together wi th 28 members of an organ- " 
ized sabotage group. Krueger related that a school was created on 16 
September 1944, in the town of Turkenberg, to train men to fight in 
small units. The students were instructed to stay behind, evade 
capture, and then harass and destroy supply lines of United States 
troops in the rear. ' 
h. When,' in January, 1945, it, became apparent that the Allied 
Forces would move into Germany proper, the German Government formed an 
organization around whiCh a future underground could be moulded. This 
was the "Werewolf" organization which set up a school to train members 
in resistance techniques. Little trouble was encountered from this . 
quarter because they did not have time to organize. By the end of 
~Iay all indications of the existence of such an organization had 
disappeared •. Other subversive organizations of the Nazis remained 
silent. 
i. As VE-Day drew closer, the number of captured key Nazi 
personnel grew larger. The shrinking refugee space and fear of the 
. approaching Russians brought to a halt the eastward migration of these 
people, and Counter Intelligence Corps arrest totals increased sharply. 
These included many hundreds of automatic arrestees as well as an even 
greater number of Wehrmacht deserters. Although not of primary counter-
intelligence interest, atrocity perpetrators and war criminals con-
tinued to be apprehended by the Counter Intelligence Corps. 
4l.0PERATIOOS IN TIlE STATIC SITUATIOO. During the fall and 
winter of 1944, plans were already under way for the organization of a 
Counter Intelligence Corps detachment which would carryon the occupa-
tional phase of the war. By 10 May 1945, the 12th Army Group Counter 
Intelligence Corps Detachment was activated by orders from Theater 
Headquarters, and the new phase of operations was launched.' The J"1 
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personnel of this detachment were prepared for their assignment, both 
by experience and instruction. 
a. After the unconditional surrender of the enemy to the 
Allied Forces, greater emphasis was placed on the de-Nazification of 
Germany. Divisional areas were divided into sectors with a Counter In-
telligence Corps team for each, and those party offices and buildings 
which were sealed during the advance ~ere reopened and thoroughly 
examined. Informants in each area were developed and leads were 
, secured which led to the arrest of many persons of high rank and posi-
tion in the Nazi regime. 
b. Largely through the efforts of informants, many former 
Gestapo and Abwehr agents were apprehended, who otherwise might have 
escaped the notice of the Counter Intelligence Corps. In the crowded 
cities of Germany, it was almost impossible to ferret these people out 
without the aid of the native informant who worked undercover. Many 
individuals of counterintelligence interest were also founc;! in the 
rural areas where the Counter Intelligence Corps, due to a lack of 
transportation facilities, did not conduct any stringent investigations 
during the early stages. By minutely combing these areas, many leading 
'Nazi officials were apprehended. ' 
c. The problem of dealing with the SS (the protective guard 
for the NSDAP) had to be solved. Where once it had been Ulegal, hence 
forced to conduct its activities underground~ the SS, aftet 1933, be-
came an organization whose duties were defined officially ~s "protecting 
the internal security of the Reich." Tile difficulty of dealing with 
this body became more acute because it permeated the entire German 
,social structure and because it could easily revert to the underground 
status whence it sprang. It was plainly evident that the SS could not 
be demobilized; consequently, every effort was made to neutralize it 
and to destroy its influence wherever it had penetrated. 
42. COOCLUS IONS. In general, the mission of the Counter Intelli-
gence Corps was to secure our forces from espionage, sabotage, and sub-
version and to destroy all enemy intelligence services. 
a. Generally, it had been, found th,at of the persons included 
in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force directives as 
automatic arrestees, only the lower echelon remained in place, while 
the higher Nazi Party members moved on. Many of those remaining, often 
,older men, appeared to be shoved into office with the expectation that 
they would be arrested instead of the more fanatical officials. 
b. The success that was obtained by the Counter Intelligence, 
Corps in these operations was due in large part to the cooperation, 
coordination, and liaison that was maintained at all levels of command. 
In many cases, operations were brought to a successful conclusion be-
cause of the rapid and concerted, action of several detachments, or 
elements ihereof;,' and cooperation of Military Government and Military 
Police. ' ' 
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c. The lack of personnel with linguistic ability and a know-
ledge of the countries where the campaigns were conducted was a serious 
handicap to the Counter Intelligence Corps. Documents of counterin-
telligence interest .could not be exploited on the spot. The solution 
of attaching interpreters was not satisfactory as they lacked counterin-
telligence training and investigative technique. Counter Intelligence 
Corps trained linguists would have eliminated this problem. 
d. The Counter Intelligence Corps in France and in Germany 
did its job well. The security which the Corps afforded to the armed 
forces was one' contributing factor toward the eventual victory of the 
Allies. . 
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CIJAPTER 10 
OPEflATICtlS IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN AREAS 
43. NORTH ATLANTIC OPERATICtlS. The global nature of World War II 
made precautions necessary to keep Germany and her co-partners from 
seizing effective jumping-off places off the coasts of America and to 
prevent them from extending their influence in bordering lands. 
a. In the North Atlantic, three Base Commands were established 
to afford additional protection to the rear of the troop concentrations 
in Europe, and to provide security against the possible seizure by 
Germany of the large land areas of Iceland, Newfoundland, and Greenland. 
b. The responsibility for the security of Newfoundland rested 
mainly with the Canadian military and naval forces, with the exception 
of several United States military installations there. The only safe-
guard in existence was the report of the natives to the nearest New-
foundland Ranger, who in turn notified the Alien Registry Bureau. 
Landings could easily be effected from the Free-French Islands of 
Miquelon and St. Pierre, only ten miles away. In the main, the Counter 
Intelligence Corps was concerned with the security of th;U;:;ited States 
military installations and with the detection of possible subversive 
activity. ' 
c. The importance of Greenland to the security of .the North 
Atlantic was not overlooked by the strategists. in their over-all plans. 
The Greenland Base Command was established early in 1942 and was com-
posed of four camps situated in different parts of the country. The 
importance of this area lay not only in its strategic position but 
also in the Kryolite mining industry there. 
d. During the period that civilian contractors and employees 
were engaged in the construction of army installations, precautionary 
measures were kept in force because of the possibility of sabotage • 
. The possibility was heightened by the long hours of darkness in winter, 
an itero which could afford any possible saboteur sufficient cover. 
Continuous securi ty checks were necessary because the people, mostly of 
Danish origin, were distinctly anti-British and without confidence in, 
. the American war effort. This lack of sympathy was quickly dispelled 
.. after theinvas ion of North Africa. 
e, These factors made it imperative for the Counter Intelli-
gence Corps to maintain a constant vigil. Port security was of great 
importance because of the accessibility of the fjords, In one ins.tance 
a United States Army post located near a fj ord was only a few miles 
. from an Eskimo island village which could easily have been used as a 
. transmission pOint for enemy intelligence. Due largely to the activi- . 
ties of the Counter Intelligence Corps, the enemy found no advantages 
in this area. 
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f. Of immediate concern to the security of American troop 
movements too was the country of Iceland where the possibility of inva-
sion by Germany was imminent. Iceland Base Command had a provisional 
Counter Intelligence Corps detachment attached to it which functioned 
until it was split into five separate detachments on 12 July, 1944. 
g. At the inception of the Counter Intelligence Corps in 
Iceland, few trained men were available, so permission was obtained to 
draw men from units in Iceland and to train them locally. Most of the 
men so procured were subsequently sent to the United States as officer 
candidates, and some were sent to the active combat zones of continental 
Europe. Here, as elsewhere, the problem of personnel procurement re-
mained acute. 
h. Counter Intelligence Corps headquarters was located in the 
capital city of Rekjavik, and its jurisdiction extended over more than 
75,000 civilians. In addition to personnel administration, Headquarters 
maintained close contact with all outlying posts, and directed operations 
and activities in them. Duties which demanded the attention of the 
Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were security control through censor-
ship of the civilian press and radio, security liaison at airdromes, port 
security, and control of the affairs of eighty-nine German nationals. 
i. In the conduct of these activities commendable work was 
done by Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in the interrogation of 
German prisoners of war captured in or brought to Iceland. During 1944, 
Counter Intelligence Corps agents interrogated 60 Germans captured at or 
near Greenland by United States forces there. On 6 and 7 October of 
that year, 28 Germans were interrogated after having been captured by the 
United States Coast Guard off the coast of Greenland. Of this group, 
12 were members of a weather observation party, while the remaining 16 
were crewmen of the scuttled trawler, the "Kehdingen." Considerable in-
formation of a military nature was gained during these interrogations, 
among them the exact locations of factories manufacturing electrical 
systems and radios for the Germans. 
j. Experience in this Command showed conclusively that only 
through the use of cultivated and trusted informants could specific and 
detailed information be o3tained. For this reason more emphasis' was 
placed on the use of informants. while the method of "door-to-door" i n-
terview, which was customary in the Zone of the Interior, was discarded. 
It was difficult to secure the cooperation of the natives in this method 
of interview because of the dislike of Icelanders to give information 
relative to one of their compatriots, regardless of the use to which such 
intelligence would be put. However, in every instance of enemy landings 
or the breach of security, civilians were found eager to notify the 
Counter Intelligence Corps for prompt and appropriate action. 
k. On the whole the.situation in these areas, from an 
operational point of view, remained relatively quiet. Some cases of 
sabotage attempts and subversion were reported, but none of these 
constituted any real threat to the war effort. Continuous liaison was 
51 
maintained by these commands with the European Theater of Operations 
and with interested Allied intelligence agencies. The situation in the 
North Atlantic did not hold the latent possibilities of danger as was 
the case in the Caribbean areas. 
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CIIAPTER 11 
OI'O':RATI<l'lS rn THE CAIIIDBEAN AREAS 
44. llACKGROUND. The Corps of Intelligence Police made its debut 
in the Caribbean Defense Command with the dispatch of two agents to 
the Panama Canal Department in the summer of 1922. These men and their 
successors were to remain the only Intelligence Police in the area 
until the growing crisis in Europe forced the recognition for great 
intelligence coverage. On 6 April, 1939, the quota of agents for the 
Canal Zone was increased to three. On 27 November of the same year, 
one agent reported to the newly activated Puerto Rican Department to 
supplement the counterintelligence work begun by the 65th Infantry 
while the island garrisons were still under the Second Corps Area. 
In 1940 the Puerto Rican quota was increased to three, and tha t of the 
Canal Zone increased to four, and in the following year the 11ar Depart-
ment authorized 12 vacancies for Panama. During all this maneuvering, 
great emphasis was placed on secrecy. 
a. To meet the emergencies that had arisen, G-2's were 
authorized to place such members of the Corps of Intelligence Police as 
they considered necessary on duty witli the Intelligence Office of any 
post, camp, or station within their cOliUnands. Tile mission included 
investigation of all cases involving espionage, counterespionage, 
sabotage and subversive activities in tile military establishment. 
b. A maj or counterintelligence problem was created by the 
influx of civilian contractors and liar Department employees who were 
engaged in the expansion of existing defenses of the Canal and on the 
. leased bases and other fortifications in the Antilles. Laborers were 
recruited with no regard to intelligence screening; turn-over was highi 
and there were few effective measures to prevent enemy agents from 
obtaining complete information as to the defenses under construction, 
or from interfering with the work by sabotage. As a direct consequence, 
on 31 July 1941, Puerto Rico's allotment of the Corps of Intelligence. 
Police personnel was increased to 25 men. 
15. OPSIV\TI<A"lS rn TIlE CANAL Z<A"lE. In November, 1941, all but the 
most important cases were dropped, and all agents received priority 
"AU assignments to learn the location of the Japanese poplliation of the 
Republic of Panama. The Japanese here were mostly young men, and the 
majprity of them seemed to be operating or working in barber sliops. 
a. The attack on Pearl Barbor started a new phase in the work 
of the Corps of Intelligence Police in the Panama Canal Department. 
Agents in Panama City and in the Atlantic Coast city of Colon performed 
excellent work in rounding up the Japanese in their areas. At the same 
time, roving tours by agents ~ere started in an attempt to keep track 
of the activities of the legations in Panama City, witli special atten-
tion being paid ~othe German and Japanese deputations. . . 
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b. Employees of the Canal were required to carry identifica-
, tion provided by the Central Labor Office, while residents of Panama 
were provided wi th cedulas by the'ir Government. The December, 1941, 
round-up of enemy aliens and 'other persons of doubtful loyalty was 
reasonably effective. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were engaged 
in the enforcement of measures requiring satisfactory identification of 
travelers entering the Republic and the Zone. 
c. During 1942 the force of enlisted Counter Intelligence 
Corps personnel was increased from 24 to 59, and a Counter Intelligence 
Corps detachment was organized on a territorial responsibility basis. 
This comprised the Pacific sector which included the Pacific half of 
the Canal Zone together Ivith Panama City and its environs; the Atlantic 
side and the Province of Colon; and the sector comprising the interior 
of the Republic of Panama exclusive of the other sectors. 
d. Espionage investigations were in the maj ori ty because of 
the military importance of the Panama Canal and the large amount of 
Allied shipping passing through it. Reports of suspects expected to 
pass through the Zone were received from the State Department, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the OJfice of Naval Intelligence, the 
Bureau of Censorship, Military Attaches, and Military Intelligence 
Service. These names were placed on the Counterintelligence Watch 
List; and upon arrival, suspects were placed under surveillance, and 
their contacts closely investigated. Disaffection investigations of 
Panama Canal employees, contractor employees, and United States Army 
employees' also made up a large percentage of the total investigations. 
Many cases of sabotage of ships calling at the Canal Zone ports were 
made, and clandestine radios and signal lights were tracked down by 
our agents. 
e. The Counter Intelligence Corps operated in this area only 
by permission of the Panamanian Government, for no agreement had been 
made for an American secret or investigative force to operate in Panama. 
Any cooperation given to the Counter Intelligence Corps was secured 
locally, for, although Panama had declared war on the Axis nations, any 
rights or privileges extended to the American Army were outlined by 
specific diplomatic agreements which applied only to specific defense 
sites and highways. The Counter Intelligence Corps was the only agency' 
which conducted investigations of espionage, sabotage, disaffection, 
treason, and sedition in the Panama Canal Zone. 
46. OPERATICl'lS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ANTILLES. Falangist and 
Nationalist activities, together with a very well-established German 
Fifth Column, made the situation in Puerto Rico very serious.' Here 
the difficulty was concerned with the disaffected elements of the popula-
tion, Axis sympathizers, encouraged by Axis successes which could not 
'be concealed by censorship. The Antilles Department (Trinidad and 
Puerto Rico) was virtually blockaded, and many ships were sunk during 
the first half of 1942. 
a. These conditions produced a mass hysteria whi.ch resulted in 
numerous charges of espionage, sabotage, and other subversive activities. 
54 
!] 
:':J 
'!.~AI 
,'I'\J 
I ~~~:ll 
:filrtJ 
~")] 
Emphns is wns shifted from investigations to counterespionage and 
countersnbotage measures, and not until the landin(js in North Africa was 
the tension eased. Submarine warfare in the area then declined, and 
the possibilities of a direct attack on the Panama Canal were considerably 
lessened. 
h. By the end of the year the strength of the Counter Intel-
ligence Corps in the Caribbean Defense Command increased to 112 men, and 
the department began to feel the problem of overstrength. Varying case 
loads, the uncertainties of Latin politics, and changes in the tactical 
situation made it difficult to gauge Counter Intelligence Corps 
personnel requirements accurately. Ilm~ever, experience was to prove 
that Counter Intelligence Corps personnel needs would bear a more direct 
relation to the area to be covered and the number of military in-
stallations in it than to over-all troop strength or to the presence 
or absence of enemy naval units in adjacent waters. 
. c. For the next sixteen months the general plan of operations 
of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments in the Caribbean remained the 
same. Security education of the troops, counterespionage, and counter-
sabotage remained the primary concern of the Counter Intelligence Corps •. 
The security provided for this area was sufficient proof that the 
Counter Intelligence Corps could adapt itself to each new contingency 
as it arose. The end of the War in Europe brought a tightening rather 
than a relaxation of security measures, and the latter part of May, 
1945, was devoted to plans to meet the counterintelligence problems 
raised by the passage of large bodies of troops en route from the 
European to the Pacific Theater. These precautions were also taken 
by the South Atlantic Theater Counter Intelligence Corps • 
• 
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CHAPTER 12 
OPERATIOOS IN TIlE SOIITH ATLANTIC THEATER 
47. ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES. Initially, Counter Intelligence 
. Corps personnel in this Theater were assigned to South Atlantic Wing, 
Air Transport Command, and later operated out of USAFSA Headquarters 
located in Recife, Brazil. When the first Counter Intelligence Corps 
Special Agents arrived in Brazil in May, 1942, that country was not yet 
a belligerent, but its Government was cooperating fully with the All ies 
in permitting us the use of her bases for operations against the enemy. 
Consequently, the activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps had to 
be safeguarded with the utmost security so as not to jeopardize our 
cordial relations with that Government. When these agents were returned 
to the United States in November for further training, the War Department 
set up a Counter Intelligence Corps detachment for Air Transport Command, 
Foreign Wings, and it took up its duties in Brazil early in 1943. A 
short time later this detachment was as.signed to USAFSA Headquarters. 
a. The detachment was divided into three sections: counter-
sabotage, counterespionage, and liaison. The basic functions of the 
countersabotage section were to check on all possible attempts at a 
sabotage of planes and material passing through the Wing. Its per-
sonnel were to continue with the development of all leads received 
through the countersabotage system and to maintain observation on the 
acts and sentiments of Brazilian employees within the mili tary bases. 
b. The liaison section was to maintain liaison with the 
Brazilian agencies for the purpose of coordinating the control and 
evacuation of suspected subversive Brazilian civilians from military in-
'stallations. It had to secure the cooperation of that Government for 
investigations into the loyalty of native employees within the United 
States Army installations. This section also performed administrative 
functions for the detachment. 
c. The counterespionage section performed various duties . 
which made it necessary for agents to wear civilian clothing. These men 
investigated leads developed by the countersabotage,section, developed 
contacts both among American and Brazilian civilian employees in the 
Army installations, and in turn gave leads to the countersabotage 
section. This interchange of information provided complete coverage 
over all types of cases. A great deal of time was spent by this section 
checking on rumors of stolen or forged passports and other vital 
statistics. 
d. This detachment (comprising all three sections) functioned 
. until February, 1944, when it was replaced by another whiCh remained on 
duty until 23 May •. The latter concerned itself with the security of 
the base and investigated all possible sabotage cases as well as Ameri- ' 
can and Brazilian personnel. Its members wore a semi-military uniform 
and represented themselves as War Department inspectors. 
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e. The third Counter Intelligence Corps Detacrunent took over 
jurisdiction on 23 May 1944, and remained on duty throughout the war. 
Thereafter, a careful finger was kept on the political pulse in that 
country, and a discreet observation was maintained over such activities 
in North Brazil as might have affected the security of American in-
stallations and American international policies. Control of suspected 
subversive civilian personnel was complete. Additional duties included 
the detection of unauthorized personnel in or near United States Army 
installations. Reports were received by this Detachment from other 
contributing investigative agencies relative to the movements of such 
suspects. Through the exchange of information with these agencies, a 
fairly accurate account was maintained of the whereabouts and activities 
of suspected individuals. All intelligence concerning such persons 
was coordinated with the Brazilian police, Brazilian Naval and Military 
Intelligence Services, and the American Consul. 
f. The Counter Intelligence Corps spread a wide net which 
nullified any attempts to injure the successful prosecution of the war. 
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CHAPTER 13 
OPERATI<X'lS IN TIlE MIDDLE EAST 
40. C<X'lDITI<X'lS EXISTING IN TIlE AREA. Headquarters lSAFlME had 
jurisdiction over the Balkans, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, 
and North i!:ast Africa, a strategic semi-circle which included the 
important city of Istanbul and the Suez Canal. The widespread use of. 
Axis propaganda, religious and racial differences, and political and 
economic conditions in this section formed a chaotic background for 
Counter Intelligence Corps operations. Operations were hampered by' 
different people with 12 major differences in political beliefs, 
approximately 57 variations of religious faiths, and at least 20 
languages vr dialects. The Counter Intelligence Corps, aside from its 
usual duties, was forced to engage in some positive espionage, in 
political reporting, in racial activities, and to become thoroughly 
cognizant of existing political and religious activities. 
49. ORGAN IZATI<X'l AND ADMIN ISTRATI<X'l. In this area Counter In-
telligence Corps personnel were assigned to Theater Headquarters and 
to the Persian Gulf Command. The first Counter Intelligence Corps de-' 
, tachment arrived in the Theater in September, 1942, and two offices were. 
established: one at'Basra, Iraq, and one at Teheran, Iran. The Counter 
Intelligence Corps then began to fan out into various sectors of the 
Theater with the exception of Greece and Bulgaria, where it was decided 
hat the Office of Strategic Services would. take over operations in 
conjunction with the British. Within five months the Counter Intelli-
gence Corps was stationed in many places in the Middle East. 
50. ACTIVITIES IN AN AREA OF MULTIPLE JURISDICTIONS. The British 
were technically in control of the Middle East but had more to do than 
they could handle and were willing to have the assistance of the Counter 
Intelligence Corps. All information gained by the Counter Intelligence ' 
'Corps was usually turned over to the British Intelligence for action. 
The Counter Intelligence Corps maintained a liaison officer with the 
Bri tish S!ME at all times where he had access to all files. 
a. To coordinate activities with our Allies, agents were given 
. liaison assignments to the various authorities in areas where field 
offices were established. All matters of mutual interests were chan-
nelled through the Liaison Desk. 
b. One Counter Intelligence Corps officer was stationed on the 
Turkish border on a semi-permanent basis. Many refugees, who were of 
security and counterespionage interest crossed the border which was 
controlled jointly by the British and French. But here, as in other 
areas, the British maintained the upper hand by virtue of their 
responsibility for the tactical security of British troops and installa-
tions. The existence of American organizations in the area.Was 
dependent on British and French courtesy. 
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c. At the Interrogation Centers, positive intelligence matters 
were covered by other agencies of the Military Intelligence Service, 
while countermeasures were taken care of by the Corps. These centers 
were located at Allepo, Suria, Haifa, Palestine, Alexandria, and [lari. 
The center at Allepo covered all refugees crossing the Turkish border, 
while the one at Haifa accommodated all Jewish refugees brought into 
Palestine by the Jewish agency. The one at Alexandria was for Yugoslavs 
and Greeks; and at Bari, it served as a clearing house for all persons 
crossing over from Yugoslavia, Albania, or Greece., 
d. These areas constituted a hotbed of espionage activity 
where nationalistic uprisings might have flared at any moment. Every 
precaution was taken to prevent the penetration of American installa-
tions. 
e. The Middle East achieved historical significance because 
of the numerous conferences that were held there to determine Allied 
strategy. The Counter Intelligence Corps provided security at all 
meetings. The conference at Cairo was an Allied operation, and 
responsibility was shared jointly with the British. The Teheran 
Conference was also of a j oint security nature which included Russian 
as well as American and British responsibility. As an aftermath to 
the Yalta Conference, a meeting was held at Great Bitter Lake in the 
Suez Canal area where President Roosevelt met King Faruk of Egypt, the 
Emperor of Ethiopia, and the King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. This 
last conference was solely an American operation. 
51. LESS<X'lS LEARNED. The most interesting and important lesson 
learned in USAFThlli was the method of cooperation between the Counter In-
telligence Corps and the British SIME. The Counter Intelligence Corps 
learned from the experience of the English in this area. British 1.n-
telligence had been operative for decades in the Middle East; and valu-
able records and background, as well as trained career personnel, had 
been developed. The Counter Intelligence Corps in this Theater operated 
as a counterpart of SIME. although the Counter Intelligence Corps was 
really the counterpart of Field Security Service which was an echelon 
below SThlE and was the organizaHon of uniformed security investigators. 
In this Theater the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps was ' 
stretched to include some positive intelligence missions, a condItion 
which proved that the principles inherent in the mission ,were elastic 
.enough to enable Counter Intelligence Corps· personnel to meet new 
contingencies. ' 
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CHAPTER 14 
OPERAT IOOS IN THE 
CHINA-BURMA- IND IA THEATER 
52. ACTIVITIES IN INDIA AND BURMA. Counter Intelligence Corps 
experienced no more than the usual difficulties of language, terrain, and 
spheres of political influence while establishing itself in this Theater. 
For the most part, Counter Intelligence Corps detachments were engaged 
in providing security for troops and installations. 
a. InasmUCh as India and Burma were British possessions, 
matters of subversion, disaffection, and politics were naturally of pri-
mary interest to them. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments operated 
with the British so as to insure the maximum intelligence coverage. 
b. During the early months of 1944, all efforts were 
toward the deployment of detachments to their proper stations. 
sections in Bombay and Delhi were ready to assume their duties 
end of June. 
directed 
Base 
by the 
c. By August, Counter Intelligence Corps investigative work 
was in full swing •. At Delhi the work continued to be primarily security 
education and publicity among the troops, but the increasing volume of 
military traffic passing through necessitated that the Bombay Detach-
~ent direct its attention more and more to port security. The Calcutta 
Detachment, in addition to sabotage and espionage investigations, had 
· begun a survey of the gasoline pipe-line and communications lines from 
Calcutta to Dhubri. Chinese agents of tbis detachment participated with 
the British Security Control in the interrogation of Chinese employees 
of the Bengal Air Depot. Toward the end of the year the Counter Intel-
ligence Corps had established a central file containing vital statistics 
on all civilians employed by United States Forces in this theater, as 
well as a regular pr.ogram of security lectures which were attended by 
the British. 
d. During the spring and summer of 1945 the detachments 
stationed in Assam and Burma, which covered the territory through which 
the Stilwell Road passed, found the security of movements over the Road 
a major problem. Security surveys were made of all important installa-
tions along the Road, and recommendations for improving security were 
· submitted. One agent accompanied a typical convoy from Doom Dooma, 
· Assam, to Kunming, China. From information gathered on this ten-day 
trip, specific recommendations were formulated and a general security 
plan evolved. In addition, units which had been in rear areas were 
briefed in security responsibility before they moved into areas where 
Japanese intelligence was believed to have been in operation. 
e. A problem similar to that of the Stilwell Road was that of 
the pipe-lines in the area. Sabotage in the form of, pilferage reached 
serious p·roportions in China, and there were numerous instances of the ' 
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same thing in Durma and India. As time went on, the local populace 
gained some knowledge of the line and became skillful in dismantling the 
couplings. Gasoline, which was at a premium in Burma, was valued by the 
natives for many purposes, ranging from illumination to barter with the 
Chinese for eggs, chickens, and salt. 
f. Extensive security surveys by Counter Intelligence Corps 
agents were made of the entire length of the pipe-lines from Bengal to 
the Chinese Border. Through the aid of the civil authorities, a plan of 
village responsibility was devised whereby a collective fine could be 
imposed on a village. To warn the civilian populace of the serious con-
sequences of sabotaging the line, a notice signed by the Deputy Chief 
·of Civil Affairs in Burma and printed in the various languages of the 
area was posted at intervals along the line in Burma. The Counter In-
telligence Corps helped organize a twenty-four hour guard system and 
investigated all pipe-line breaks. 
g. In the Indian rear areas during the final months of the 
war, emphasis was placed on a program of security education and security 
enforcement, in addition to the investigation of specific cases of . 
suspected enemy Fifth Column activities. The maintenance of a high 
standard of military security among Theater troops was a continuing 
problem. As Allied successes increased, military personnel tended to 
forget that carelessly disclosed information might reach Japanese in-
telligence. Efforts were increased to educate personnel iii their 
responsibili ty for safeguarding military information by means of radio 
announcements, weekly security reminders, and lectures and films. 
h. With the cessation of hostilities in Southeast Asia, a 
large number of American prisoners of war were released from jails and 
camps in Java, Singapore, Burma, Thailand, and French Indo-China. These 
ex-prisoners were taken to Calcutta where hospital treatment was 
administered and preparations were made for their return to the United 
States. The Counter Intelligence Corps was designated as the 
investigative agency to gather what information they could from these 
men for the War Crimes Branch of the Judge Advocate General's office. 
53. ACTIVITIES IN CHINA. As activity increased in this Theater, 
it became apparent that new installations and expanded facilities had 
to be undertaken in order to accommodate additional personnel and 
material. Fortunately, the Counter Intelligence Corps was present in 
the Theater at this time and was able to execute its mission (security 
of installations against enemy activities) simultaneously with the 
expansion, rather than come in afterward as had been the experience in 
the past. 
a. As Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were relieved from 
assignment in Burma and India, they were transferred to the Chinese Area 
where Counter Intelligence Corps detaChments were operating with the 
Chinese troops. Relationships with the Chinese commanders depended on 
the individual agent; these remained cordial. There were some isolated 
acts of violence against American personnel, but these were due to a 
I 
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lack of information on the political character of Chinese units and 
communities. 
b. When the Counter Intelligence Section, Office of the 
Theater G-2, was created 'in February, 1945, a sub-section was establiShed 
to deal with the .security of plans and operations. This office was 
staffed with G-2, not Counter Intelligence Corps, personnel. By May 
it had become apparent from numerous instances of loose handling and 
compromise of Top Secret information that if effective protection were 
to be given additional measures would be necessary. The Theater G-2 
recommended that a special detaChment of Counter Intelligence Corps 
personnel be created to extend the activities of the security of Plans 
and Operations SUb-section throughout the Theater, working through the 
G-2, and under the special direction of the Chief of the Counter Intel-
ligence Section. 
c. The recommendation was approved by the Theater Commander 
who issued credentials to each member of the special detachment authoriz-
ing them to have access to all operational and Top Secret information. 
The first task of the detaChment was a survey of existing conditions 
and the submission of reconunendations. Recommendations were submitted 
on 21 June. It was the opinion of all the participating agents that 
while the general application of stringent security measures would 
partially remedy the situation, constant daily supervision and planning 
of the security of such information would be necessary to provide 
effective protection. This work proceeded successfully during the 
remaining months of the war. 
d. With the increasing tempo of the war, there grew a corre-
sponding increase in the activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps. 
On 3 June a Counter Intelligence Corps detachment was assigned to work 
wi th the Chinese Combat Command. This was an experimental proj ect to 
provide the maximum security of American installations, security educa-
tion for all Chinese units being trained by the Command, and the 
gathering of intelligence and counterintelligence information under 
combat conditions; Two teams were immediately dispatched to the Eastern 
. and Central Commands to put the program into operation. The pIal! itself 
had not been put completely into effect at the time of the cessation of 
hostilities, but it did assist Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in 
creating a security consciousness among the various headquarters with 
which they were working. 
e. A third team had been briefed for work with the Kwangsi 
Command, and finally. results were beginning to come in from the work 
of the team with the Central Command. These results generally proved 
that Counter Intelligence Corps teams could operate effectively in 
conjunction with the Chinese armies. 
54. SOUTHEAST CHlNA PROJECT. In May, 1945, plans were formulated 
to place a detachment of Counter Intellig~nce Corps personnel in Eastern 
Kwantung Province, east of the Japanese-held corridor. Its purpose was 
to gather counterintelligence information through, their own efforts and 
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through such available sources as the United States Navy Group, the 
Office of Strateg ic Services, the 14th Air Force, and the various 
Chinese military and civil authorities friendly to the Central Govern-
ment. 
a. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel, well qualified for 
such an assignment, were available in sufficient numbers. Chinese-
Americans, fluent in the Cantonese and Ilakka' dialects prevalent in this 
area, were selected and staged in Kunming. Appropriate discussions were 
held with the recently appOinted mayor of Canton and, after several 
preliminaries, the plan emerged as a joint Office of Strategic Services 
and Counter Intelligence Corps enterprise. As a result, the Counter 
Intelligence Corps gained access to a vast accumulation of Black-List 
information from the Office of Strategic Services. 
U. The termination of hostilities found the China Theater in-
creasing its offensive momentum, and intelligence agencies of all kinds 
were planning expanded operations rather than a program of post-war 
activity •. This was quickly changed with a clear definition of the post-
hostilities mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps in China. The 
mission of the United States forces in the China Theater was to help 
the Chinese, however, and not to carryon independent operations against 
the enemy. The jurisdiction of the Counter Intelligence Corps was 
limited to activities directly involving American personnel and installa-
tions. In such circumstances the principal danger zones from a security 
Viewpoint were outside the jurisdiction of the Counter Intelligence ' 
Corps, and complete reliance had to be put in the Chinese counterin-
telligence agencies. . 
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CllAPl'ER 15 
OPERATIU'lS IN AlASKA 
55. INTRODOCTIU'l. The Pacific phase of the war extended the activ-
. ities of the Counter Intelligence. Corps from Alaska to the Philippine 
Islands. The Counter Intelligence Corps operated in areas where the 
people, language, and customs were almost unknown; and although there 
were no large cities or towns, the security of the American installa-
tions was maintained. The responsibilities of the Counter Intelligence 
Corps in these areas were equal to those of the Counter Intelligence 
Corps in the European Theaters. 
56. ORGANIZATIU'l. Intelligence activities in Alaska prior to the 
development of a large military force were carried out by the 5-2 of 
the Alaskan Defense Command. Emphasis was placed on the establishment 
of an extensive informant system in the towns of the Territory and in-
cluded both military and civilian personnel. The wisdom of this was 
demonstrated during the SUbsequent military development and expansion. 
a. In July, 1941, two special agents of the Corps of Intelli-
gence Police arrived in the area; one being assigned to the Office of 
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the other to the Post Intelli-
gence Office, Fort Richardson. Early attention was given to the in-
vestigation of individuals and organizations whose loyalty to the 
United States had been questioned. Vital military and semi-civilian 
installations closely connected with the military program were safe-
guarded. . 
b. On 1 January 1942, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel 
numbered nine special agents, all of whom were on detached service with 
Headquarters Alaskan Defense Command from Western Defense Command, and 
Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, California. By 1 May 1943, 
there were 18 special agents and four officers on duty with the Alaskan 
Defense Command. All of the Counter Intelligence Corps officers had 
- served as special agents prior to being commissioned. Throughout the 
history of the Corps in Alaska, it had not always been possible to 
procure officers who had been especially trained in Counter Intelli-
gence Corps work. Authority to recruit agents from within the Alaskan. 
Department was granted by the War Department on 15 August 1944. 
57. OPERATIU'l AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE. Jurisdiction and 
responsibility for all intelligence matters within the Territory of 
Alaska and within the jurisdiction of the War Department were the sole 
responsibility of the Commanding General, Alaskan Department. This 
jurisdiction and responsibility was recognized regardless of the 
military command immediately concerned with the intelligence activity. 
However, the division of intelligence functions and responsibilities 
among the Counter Intelligence Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, and the Office of Naval Intelligence had followed the dictates of 
the appropriate War Department directives. 
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a. Throughout the course of the campaign in this Theater, 
Counter Intelligence Corps personnel had not been directly utilized in ' 
combat operations. However, numerous counterintelligence functions had 
been performed by the detachment which were directly associated with the 
Attu and Kiska campaigns and with the continuous combat operations of 
the 11th Air Force. 
b. Much of the time Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were 
engaged in the enforcement of the enemy alien control which was set up 
early in the war period. All enemy aliens were placed in internment 
camps and the Counter Intelligence Corps was called upon for recommenda-
tions relative to the advisability of permitting them to return to their 
homelands. In addition to these duties, the Counter Intelligence Corps 
conducted investigations on all types of cases, and security waS 
sufficiently tight that there were no cases of enemy inspired acts of 
sabotage or espionage. Moreover, considerable investigative work was 
performed in this area for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
United States Treasury Department, and other Federal and Territorial 
agencies. 
c. During this campaign, frequent requests were received by 
the Counter Intelligence Corps from other agencies for investigative 
assistance. In many instances the duties requested had not been of a 
strict counterintelligence nature, but in all cases they had a direct 
bearing on the successful prosecution of the war effort. Immigration 
and Naturalization Service relied entirely upon the reports of in-
vestigations prepared by the Counter Intelligence Corps to determine 
the suitability of enemy aliens for United States citizenship. The 
close cooperation that existed among the various agencies was an 
important contributory factor to the successful conclusion of opera-
tions in the Theater. ' 
"' .. ' 
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CHAPTER 16 
OPERATIOOS IN TIlE HAWAIIAN 15LANDS 
50. 'INTROOUCTIOO. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 
December 1941, the Corps of Intelligence Police already had plans in 
readiness for a rigid security control. While enemy planes were still 
active over Hickam Field, Japanese residents, known to be strongly pro-
Japanese in their sentiments, were apprehended and placed in custody. 
From that beginning until the end of the war, constant pressure was 
maintained in varying degrees on persons of alien ancestry or citizen-
ship, particularly the 160,000 Japanese residents of the Territory. In-
vestigation of suspected subversive elements not only resulted in the 
apprehension of the maj ority of persons likely be of danger to internal 
security, but it made potential subversive elements aware that Counter 
Intelligence Corps agents were constantly on the alert. These 
activities made it necessary to spot agents over all the island in the 
Group and to provide effective administration over their activities. 
59. ORGANIZATIOO. In the early phase of the war the Hawaiian 
Department was under the jurisdiction of the Central Pacific Base Com-
mand, and later under the Middle Pacific [lase Area (MIDPAC). Until 
that time all the efforts of the Counter Intelligence Corps had been 
turned toward the local scene and to the maintenance of the internal 
security of the Hawaiian Islands. Combat detachments were left to fend 
for themselves almost totally. When the Counter Intelligence Corps was 
brought directly under the Middle Pacific Base Area, it was realized 
that forward area detachments required as much attention as local units, 
and that their functions were to be increasingly important. Consequently, 
direct contact was immediately established with them and Headquarters 
Detachment set up the machinery to supervise their activities. This 
detachment acted as a central agency for all counterintelligence informa-
tion in the Middle Pacific Base Area and circulated this intelligence 
to all detachments .and to the War Department. 
a. One of the first two overseas Counter Intelligence Corps 
units was activated in Honolulu on 1 January 1942, and was assigned to 
G-2 Headquarters, Ilawaiian Department. This detachment, together with 
others that came to the Islands subsequently, were concerned with opera-
tions in that area until August. 1944, when the Counter Intelligence 
Division began to participate in the combat phases of the war. From 
then on Counter Intelligence Corps detachments were dispatched from 
the Islands to Iwo Jima and Saipan. 
b. In the meantime, agents had received additional training 
in the Counter Intelligence Corps school on the mainland which had been 
in operation since August, 1941. Stess was placed on the principle of 
security control in the Islands, an item which the Counter Intelligence 
Corps was to face many times ,as United 'States Forces landed in different 
areas in the Pacific. 
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60. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS CONTROLS IN INSULAR AREAS. Strict 
control of all travel to and from the Territory and between the islands 
was maintained by close cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In connection with the 
security checks and surveys, a series of lectures was given to military 
personnel and Department of the Army civilians working closely with 
them. Army units stationed there were assisted in keeping equipment, 
classified information, and stations inviolate by a series of security 
tests conducted by the Counter Intelligence Corps. All this was 
necessary because of the imminence of danger from such sources as enemy 
agents, disaffected persons and saboteurs. 
a. For the first year and a half of wartime Counter Intelli-
gence Corps operations in this area, martial laiv was in effect. This 
gave the Counter Intelligence Corps the right of search and seizure. 
Hundreds of persons were apprehended and examined (including citizens 
of the United States). On 25 October 1944, martial law was ended and 
citizens were no longer detained. Of the 1,599 persons that had been 
apprehended by September, 1945, 1,466 were Japanese. The rest were 
114 Germans, 17 Italians, and 2 French. Most of these persons had been 
released or paroled, repatriated, or relocated by this time, and only 
494 remained in custody. 
b. When martial law was dispensed with, the Counter Intelli-
gence Corps responsibility increased. Not only were all cases involving 
espionage, sabotage, subversion. treason, etc., made the responsibility 
of the Corps, but it was also called upon to prosecute all security 
violations. In addition, the Counter Intelligence Corps continued the 
work of preparing all internment and exclusion cases and was designated 
as the agency to coordinate the activities of all investigative organiza-
tions in the territory. All inter-Hawaiian travel was placed under 
the continuous supervision of the Counter Intelligence Corps. This Vias 
\Jreatly facilitated by the appearance on 9 January 1944, of an Air 
Force Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment which could operate with 
equal ease in both rear and forward areas. Unquestionably, the Counter 
Intelligence Corps activities in the Territory of Hawaii contributed 
significantly to the fact that there was no known espionage, nor a 
single case of enemy-inspired sabotage, there during the war. 
c. Counter Intelligence Corps operations on Saipan, 11'10 Jima, 
and Okinawa were launched from !lawaii. On Iwo Jima, the Counter In-
telligence Corps, because of the absence of a civilian population, de-
veloped no tactical mission, and personnel were used as an escorting 
party for visiting dignitaries over the island. On Saipan, perhaps for 
the first time, an Air Force Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was 
utilized in the assault phase of an invasion. The Counter Intelligence 
Corps on this island, together with Tinian and Guam, carried out the 
specific mis'sion of neutralizing the efforts of enemy agents who might 
threaten the security of Air Force installations. 
d. The Battle of Okinawa opened on 1 April 1945. It marked 
the last operation for Counter Intelligence Corps detachments in forward 
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areas under this command. As the Philippine campaign drew to a close,' 
~ounter Intelligence Corps experience gained on Okinawa became of value, 
since bere the American Forces came in direct contact with Japanese 
citizens in their homelan~. Several agents lost ,their lives in the 
batt~es for possession of ,the island. 
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CHAPTER 17 
OPERATIrns IN TIlE SOUTIHVEJT PACIFIC 
61. EARLY ORGANIZATIrn. At General MacArthur's Headquarters in 
Australia, intelligence responsibilities were allocated in accordance, 
with the command structure. By the end of April 1942, the office of 
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, United States Army 
Forces in Australia (USAFIAl, began operating primarily as a counterin-
telligence agency with a nucleus of 14· officers and men. Shortages of 
personnel and official directives on which to base training and opera-
tions were felt from the beginning. These first fourteen men were 
given a three-week Counter Intelligence Corps course in the first 
Counter Intelligence Corps school to be organized in Australia. 
a. Procurement of desired personnel for this school training 
proved difficult because of the highly selective policy then in force. 
Moreover, many preferred to go to the Officers Candidate School which 
opened in Australia. To encourage recruits, considerable informality 
was practiced. Preference was accorded to lawyers, newspaper men, in-
surance adj usters, and the like. 
b. In early spring and summer of 1942, large numbers of troops 
arrived in Australia. The G-2 Section of the United States Army Forces 
in Australia undertook to develop counterintelligence activities at 
base sections level. Seven base sections had been organized by the time 
of the inception of the GIIQ. By July th(l G-2 Section had succeeded in 
having intelligence officers appointed in the five major bases, and 
Counter Intelligence Corps agents were assigned to the base intelli-
. gence offices as they became available. Although the base intelli-
uence officers administratively were responsible to the base com-
manders, counterintelligence functions were under the operational con-
trol of G-2, United States Army Forces in Australia. All phases of the 
Counter Intelligence Corps mission were of equal concern in these 
bases as they were the gateways to Australia. 
c. The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps at this time 
was limited in scope. The Corps was to assure the security of all 
personnel and materials; conduct investigations of disaffection. sabo-
tage, and espionage; and indoctrinate troops in security matters. Con-
tinuous liaison and cooperation were maintained with the Australian and 
other interested agencies in establishing the security of installations, 
documents, and materiel. Australian Security Service naturally assumed 
the leadership in anti-espionage work on the Australian mainland. Be-
cause of the distant lines of communications and the sparsely settled 
parts of Australia, a greater dependence was placed on the Counter In-
telligence Corps for adequate coverage. 
d. Beginning in mid-sununer, Allied Headquarters. launched its 
strategic plan of meeting the Japanese thrust north of Australia. 
Operations north of the Australian mainland' c.ommenced on 17 October at 
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?ort Moresby, New Guinea, which was then designated as the Advance Base. 
After the Japanese were expelled from the Milne Bay area, the Sub-
Advance Base was established there. The opening of Advance Base offices 
introduced a new era in Counter Intelligence Corps field activities. 
Now with the enemy lines not far away and with his agents or collabora-
tors at work within Allied lines, active countering of enemy espionage 
and sabotage efforts was necessary and, as a consequence, additional 
officers were assigned to the Port Moresby office. 
62. REORGANIZATION OF TIlE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS. The first 
Counter Intelligence Corps combat personnel to reach the SWPA theater 
arrived in Australia in April, a detachment of 5 officers and 39 agents 
destined for the Sixth Uni ted States Army. Dud ng the fa llowi ng months, 
detachments arrived for the other major tactical units in the theater, 
and this personnel was assigned directly to the units with which they 
were to operate. They were under the administrative supervision of 
the commanding officer of the uni t and under the operational control 
of the unit intelligence officer. This was similar to the procedure 
followed in the base sections where base commanders exercised control 
over agents working out of the base intelligence offices. The 
administration, employment, training, and operating procedures of 
Counter Intelligence Corps personnel depended on the judgment of com-
manders of units to which they were assigned. This poliCy threatened 
the stability of organization as well as the efficiency of Counter In-
telligence Corps activities, and 'as a consequence several administrative 
changes were made. 
a. The first major change in Counter Intelligence Corps 
organizations in the theater occurred on 30 March, when the Chief, 
Counter Intelligence Corps, was made directly responsible to the Assist~ 
ant Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army Forces in the Far East. 
This was followed by another change on 18 May, when the War Department 
relieved all Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in SWPA from their 
unit assignments and assigned them to Headquarters, United States Army 
Forces in the Far East, and immediate steps were taken to reorganize. 
On 26 June, as a result of a conference held in the office of the G-2, 
United States Army Forces in the Far East, to determine the delegation 
of counterintelligence responsibilities to subordinate intelligence 
agencies, the Counter Intelligence Corps in the theater was made the 
direct responsibility of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps. 
b. In the meantime, plans were under way to overcome the 
problem of personnel shortage by the introduction of a permanent Counter 
'Intelligence Corps training school in the theater. At this school, 
agents recruited within the theater were niven the necessary training, 
and agents previously trained in the United States were given advanced 
training in subjects peculiar to the local areas. Reports received 
from the relatively few agents on duty in New Guinea indicated their 
lack of adequate preparation for combat; and, to offset this, a course 
was instituted at Counter Intelligence Corps Headquarters in Brisbane 
on 28 June 1943 to provide advanced training. The quality of instruc-
tion at this school was improved by experts from various Australian 
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intelli~ence and field a~encies. They enabled the students to obtain in-
formation from the best available authority on SWPA combat conditions. 
The gratifying results of the school's program led to its permanent 
status. 
c. The school instructors' task was eased by the appearance of 
Technical Manual 30-215, "Counter Intelligence Corps." This helped in 
the development of the Counter Intelligence Corps because basic princi-
ples of operation were laid down and command responsibilities in in-
telligence work were described in detail. 
d. A counterintelligence conference was called on 0 September, 
at which plans were laid down for Counter Intelligence Corps participa-
tion in combat operations. The formation of detachments to aCcompany 
Sixth Army task forces into action was made a joint responsibility of 
the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, and the G-2, Sixth Army. Actual 
control of operations waS to be the responsibility of the Detachment 
Commander under the supervision of the Army or task force intelligence 
officer. 
e. By the end of 1943, Counter Intelligence Corps operations 
extended throughout the theater from Sydney to New Guinea. There were 
26 units in operation. Four were with combat divisions, two with Sixth 
Army Headquarters, one wi th I Corps Headquarters, five wi th the Fifth 
Air Force, and the remainder with the American Service of Supplies 
(USASOS) bases and sub-bases. Counter Intelligence Corps wotk was still 
being carried on under base and unit intelligence officers, and there 
was constant liaison between United States Army Service of Supplies base. 
offices and G-2, United States Army Forces in the Far East. Later that 
year" the flow of troops to the north reached such proportions that the 
administrative machinery required revision. 
f. To meet these new requirements, the War Department on 24 
January 1944, published T/O&E 30-500, authorizing the establishment of 
Counter Intellig,ence Corps detachments and teams. On 14 March all 
Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were relieved from assignment to 
the War Department and assigned to the theater in which they served. On 
20 April the 5227th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment (Provisional) 
was created to operate under the supervision of G-2, Headquarters, 
United States Army Forces in the Far East; and the Chief, Counter In-
telligence Corps, became the commanding officer. With this change, 
',central control of Counter Intelligence Corps operations and personnel 
was at last achieved. Plans were formulated for organizing personnel 
at bases and uni ts into Counter Intelligence Corps detachments, 
responsible only to the commanding officer of the Provisional Detach-
ment. Combat detachments were organized for tactical units varying in 
size proportionate to the unit to which attached. The growth of the 
Counter Intelligence Corps paralleled the growth in troop strength. 
63. COUNTFl{ INTELLIGENCE CORPS IN' COMBAT IN TIlE ADMIRALTY ISLANDS. 
The first Counter Intelligence Corps combat detachment to enter the SWPA 
as a complete unit was that which came overseas with the First Cavalry' 
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Qivision in July, 1943. The members of this detachment were put through 
an intensive six-weeks' course covering duties of a combat counterin-
telligence team, weapons, and jungle lore. Prior to the invasion of 
the Admiralty Islands the 'team instituted a training program for all 
troops in the task force. Included in this course were lectures on 
security, censorship, handling of prisoners of war, collection of 
documents, and the comparative quality of enemy equipment. 
a. One member of this detachment landed on Los Negros Island 
in the Admiralties Group on 29 February 1944 with advance reconnaissance 
elements; and together with a member of the Allied Translator and Inter-
preter Section (ATlS) , he gathered several hundred pounds of documents 
and dispatched the first report on counter Intelligence Corps combat 
activities with assault troops. As a result of the effort of the 
Counter Intelligence Corps and the Allied Translator and Interpreter 
Section, information was obtained which facilitated the landing in 
strength on Manus Island. Other members of this detachment landed with 
additional elements of the 1st Cavalary Division. The entire campaign 
was heavily contested and casualties ran high among the troops. How-
'ever, the Counter Intelligence Corps unit survived unscathed and made 
an excellent record as the first Counter Intelligence Corps detachment 
to participate in a complete operation. Considerable patrol work re-
sulted in the capture of many valuable documents and considerable 
amounts of enemy materiel which were turned over to the Allied Trans-
lator and Interpreter Section. 
b. In the ensuing operations, the Allied Translator and Inter-
preter Section became possibly the most important single intelligence 
agency of the Pacific phase of the war. Its basic mission was the 
translation of captured documents and the interrogation of prisoners of 
war. This was accomplished through the effective pooling of an initially 
'small number (35) of Allied linguists. The organization remained inter-
Allied and inter-service in character from the time it was organized on 
19 September 1942 until September. 1945, when its strength exceeded 
1,900 officers and "enlisted men. 
64. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS IN TIlE NEU GUINEA OPERATIONS. 'The 
American troop concentrations rose from 21,901 in June, 1943, to 80,045 
in March, 1944, in New Guinea. and this number was increased as the 
Army advanced. 
a. The 32nd Division Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment 
, landed at Saidor, and agents were assigned to, regiments and Regimental 
. Combat Teams. necause of the large area t.o be covered, some of the 
agents operated as "free lancers" and covered patrols and other 
specialized operations, while the Combat teams carried on with routine 
duties. Five men participated in the landing operations at Ya1aw 
Point, going in with the second wave and making immediate contact with 
the forward troops. Their activities a"long the Yaganon and Yokai 
Rivers and in the village of Kubuk yielded a large quantity of Japanese 
documents including technical and training manuals and a casualty 
record book. In addition to their other duties, these agents conducted 
front line lectures to the troops on the importance of taking prisoners. 
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0. On 22 April 1944, tile 24th Division Counter Intellivcnce 
corps Detachment initiated its activities at Tanah /.ierah Bay, Hollundia, 
with tile Gssistunce of a detachment of 4 Allied Translator and Inter-
preter Section men. At this point a highly effective native police-
boy system was inaugurated in cooperation with the Netherlands Indies 
Civil Administration (NICA). These youths contacted village chiefs, 
led reconnaissance patrols, helped interrogate native suspects, and 
assisted in special investigations and in maintaining an informant net-
work. ConsideraiJle information of a tactical and counterintelli\jence 
significance was obtained from these sources • 
c. The 41st Division Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment 
together with the I Corps Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment performed 
distinguished service at Hollandia and Diak early in July. Botll of . 
these detaChments maintained close liaison during these operations which 
netted close to 2,000 pounds of documents found hidden in caves. 
Personnel of these detachments, with the aid of Dutch Counter Intelli-
gence Corps personnill at Netherlands Indies Civil Adlilinistration Head-
quarters, conducted daily interrogations of natives and other persons 
recently liiJerated; and, as a result, valuable tactical and counterin-
telliuence information was obt1lined. The services performed during 
this operation was considered of such importance that the conunanding 
officer of I Corps Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was awarded 
the Bronze Star on·28 July. 
d. Toward the end of July, members of the 6th Division 
Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment landed with the advance elements 
at Sansapor on Dutch New Guinea. During most of the month the Detach-
ment operated in the ~.affin Bay sector of the Wadke-Sarmi front. 
Agents continued to be attached to regiments and often operated under 
harassing enemy fire. While in the Maffin Bay area this detachment 
set up an effective system for the interception of enemy documents and 
equipment which were being carried out of the forward areas by the 
troops; and with the cooperation of the Military Police, all vehicles 
en route to the rear areas were inspected. The Counter Intelligence· 
Corps in SWPA suffered its first casualty in this operation. 
65. OPERATIONS IN TIlE SOL<XIION ISLANDS. After the expUlsion of 
the Japanese from Bougainville, comparative quiet set in and the 
activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps combat team there were 
limited to the bivouac area. Agents enforced rules of censorship and 
formulated an SOP for handling classified documents. Security 
procedures were strictly enforced; and from early June, 1944, on, there 
was little danger of infiltration by the enemy. During the entire 
period of occupation of Guadalcanal by the American Forces, there were 
no instances of espionage or suspected espionage activity. This situa-
tion, however, was not unusual because of the total absence of any white 
population and the presence of a relatively small native population 
which had not been under Japanese domination long enough to have been 
influenced in favor of the Ni~ponese. The one source of possible 
espionage activity, the traffic of ship personnel to shore and shore 
.. personnel to ships laying in the harbor, was quickly recognized as 
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dangerous, and immediate steps were taken to neutralize it through 
additional measures of port security. 
66. OPERATIONS IN NEW HEBRIDES. The Counter Intelligence Corps in 
New Caledonia operated in liaison wi th the local French Gendarmerie, and 
they were primarily concerned with the Japanese population there. The 
Counter Intelligence Corps of the Island Command and the 25th Division 
provided coverage for the island which included observations and 
investigation of certain French civilians as well as the Japanese 
elements there. Various reports of Japanese submarine landings on the 
island were investigated by the Counter Intelligence Corps, but no 
positive evidence was ever obtained that any Japanese were landed in 
this way. Orientation and training of troops occupied a great deal of 
the time. These activities were carried on through the summer of 1944. 
a. Reconnaissance patrols demonstrated how easily the enemy 
could land on the various New Hebrides Islands without being detected. 
Because of this situation, Counter Intelligence Corps offices had, by 
September, been established in strategic areas within the geographical 
limits of the New Caledonia Island Command for the purpose of providing 
complete security coverage and for expediting the transmission of 
counterintelligence information to this Headquarters. These district 
offices maintained close liaison with the local French authorities, 
with chiefs of the French Militia, and with French Army and Navy coast-
watching stations. 
b. District Offices were likewise charged with the 
responsibili ty of maintaining periodic contact with French and native 
informant systems that had been set up in .those areas. An informant 
network was built up that reached into most tribes, villages, and out-
lying districts of the islands. This proved to be a lucrative and 
valuable channel of counterintelligence information. 
67. OPERATIONS IN TI-IE FIJI ISLANDS. In these islands the 
activities of the'Counter Intelligence Corps were limited because of 
the curtailment of military activity there and the attendant large 
scale reductions in personnel. However, the utilization of Fiji as an 
important supply base warranted the retention of Counter Intelligence 
Corps personnel to preserve the security of warehouses and other 
supply facilities. Moreover, the large Indian element in the popula-
tion, which represented a potentially anti-Allied sentiment, was a 
matter of concern to the Corps. 
68. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THESE ISLAND ACTIVITIES. By September, 
1944, the Counter Intelligence Corps had learned that it was sound 
policy not to land before Battalion Headquarters during an invasion. 
After an invasion the disposition of Counter Intelligence Corps 
personnel depended on the tactical situation, transportation, condi-
tions of roads, etc. In perimeter defense and when transportation was 
available, it was found that personnel could operate from higher Head-
quarters. When the troops were advancing, Counter Intelligence Corp. 
personnel accompanied Regimental and Battalion Headquarters at a1l 
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times, leaving a small reserve of personnel with higher Headquarters so 
that proper distribution of agents could conform to new tactical situa-
tions which might arise. 
a. A tremendous amount of intelligence information came from 
. ,the documents captured during these early operations. The collection 
of these documents was made possible by the painstaking efforts of 
Counter Intelligence Corps in the conduct of numerous lectures to the 
troops on the importance of each scrap of written matter. 
b. As the combat phase of hostilities subsided, Counter In-
telligence Corps detachments conducted a thorough security program. 
Headquarters, message centers, communications facilities, and field 
offices were surveyed regularly; and daily inspections were also made 
to insure that outgoing patrols carried nothing of intelligence value 
to the enemy in the event of capture or casualty. Ily the end of July, 
1944, many Counter Intelligence CQrps cQmbat detachments were operating 
.or abQut to be activated under the authQri ty .of the 5227th CQunter In-
telligence CQrps Detachment (PrQvisiQnal) in the SQuthwest Pacific 
Theater. These were created because of the tQPQgraphy .of the areas .of ' 
.operations. 
c. In these DperatiQns in MicrQnesia, it was learned that 
during the first stages .of any invasiQn little evidence .of enemy 
sympathizers and cQllabQrators CQuid be fQund. Only after hQstilities 
had ceased and an area was made secure by United States trQQPs did 
natives make any effQrt tQ repQrt suspected persQns or activities tQ 
Allied Government .officials. All person.nel, war cQrresPQndents, photo-
graphers, and the like were under .orders tQ repQrt tQ the CQunter In-
telligence CQrps detachment in their area tQ prQve the authenticity 
.of their missiQn and credentials. 
d. OperatiQnally, the fQremQst task prior tQ the invasiQn of . 
the Philippines was the develQpment of the CQunter Intelligence CQrps 
cQmbat prQ\jram,_ procuring and training the personnel, and the determina-
tion .of the mission .of· the Corps in combat. A feeling of tensiQn, .of 
hurry, increased as the time approached for maj .or blows against Japan. 
e. At the outset it was agreed that until American fQrces 
were .operating in United States territories, the Counter Intelligence 
Corps would work in close cQnjunction witil the governments hQlding 
sovereignty and wi th their intel:ligence auencies. In the Australian 
mandates, liaisQn was fostered' and maintained with the Australian New 0; 
Guinea Administrative Units (ANGAU). Upon ellterinlJ the Netherlands 
East Indies, close coordinatiQn developed with the Netherlands Indies x 
Civil Administration (NICA) and with tile Netherlands Forces Intelli-
gence Service (NEFIS), especially regarding civilian and native cQntrQl. 
Ollce action had begun on a landing, tllC work of tile Counter Intelli-
gence Corps broadened in many directions. Seizure of enemy dQcuments 
and equipment, cQntrol .of movements behind the lines, interrogation of 
prisQners fQr counterintelligence infQrmatiQn, and many other tasks 
occupied counterintelligence officers and agents. 
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f. By October, 1944, on the eve of the invasion of the 
Philippines, detachments had taken some part in every important action. 
They had been in the field with two armies, four corps, fifteen divi-
sions, and one regimental, combat team. Combat operational methods had 
to be worked out as new missions were assigned. During this ten-month 
period more than half the total of Counter Intelligence Corps per$onnel 
in the theater had been in combat or attached to tactical units • 
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OPEllATI<l'lS IN THE PIIll..IPPlNE lSLANDS 
69. PIlli-lNVAS Ia'l PLANN lNG. A Counter Intelligence Corps Training 
School was established at P'dlmarosa !louse in Brisbane, July, 1944. To 
provide first-hand information, persons familiar with the Philippines 
were invited to address the classes; and for the first time in this 
theater, instruction in the national language of the islands, Tagalog, 
was provided. The school's curriculum was aimed at solving those 
problems facing an American investigator in the Philippines; viz, 
language, customs, habits, character and traits of the natives, names 
of geographical locations, local laws, methods of investigation, secret 
SOCieties, etc. 
a. On 24 August, 50 Filipinos from the 2nd Filipino Battalion 
were enrolled for a four_weeks' course in preliminary Counter Intelli-
gence Corps training. Upon graduation these men served as instructors 
for the entire l3attalion. So successful were the results of the 
training rec.eived in this school that by the end of September plans 
were already drawn up for the operation of three schools in the theater. 
b. These preparatory plans entailed also the vital responsibil-
ity of the Counter Intelligence Corps to secure the staging and move-
ment of a quarter of a million troops and their equipment into the 
largest areas of the islands, while insuring a maximum element of 
surprise. This was effect.ively accomplis·hed, liutonly at the expense 
of a twenty-four hour vigilance by officers and agents over the 
principal points of information leakage. 
c. Before leaving New Guinea, Counter Intelligence Corps 
personnel were thoroughly briefed on the tactical features of the coming 
operation and the duties to be performed. Agents were given lists of 
the political officials and guerrilla leaders which had been prepared 
by the Counter. Intelligence Section in a "Who's \'/ho" of the Philippine 
Islands. While 011 board the transports, lectures on Counter Intelli-
. gence Corps functions and proper distribution of enemy equipment and 
documents, as well as lectures on security, were given frequently. 
70. THE LANDlNG PllASE. One of the most sensational tactical 
surprises of the war was achieved with the invas iOI1 of Leyte on 20 
October, 1944. The shift of dates and direction from Mindanao to Leyte, 
and the tactical feints employed by the Navy, were laruely instrumental 
in effecting this surprise. The preservation of security by American 
troops must be given due credit as well. Considering the large number 
of ships and personnel involved in the operation and the fact that 
secrecy was maintained, this stands out as a maj or security accomplish-
ment. 
a. More than 70 Counter Intelligence Corps officers and agents 
together with attached Filipinos made the initial landings with elements 
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of the Sixth Army, Xth and XXIVth Corps, and 7th, 24th, 96th, and 1st 
Cavalry Divisions. The 7th and 96th Divisions entered Leyte under the 
XXIVth Corps from the Central Pacific Theater. The task of coordinating 
Counter Intelligence Corps activities and maintaining constant liaison 
with Army and Navy officials was assigned to the 306th (Sixth Army) 
Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment which acted in a supervisory 
capacity during the combat phase. All the detachments were broken down 
into teams, some of them going forward with the regiments, some remain-
ing with the command posts, and others setting up Headquarters in the 
towns or villages. 
b. The 224th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was among 
the first detachments ashore, landing on A-Day in the vicinity of Dulag, 
20 miles south of Tacloban on Leyte Gulf. Tactical circumstances pre-
vented the introduction of counterintelligence measures during the first 
few hours. The civilian situation in Dulag was critical, and the first 
few days were spent interrogating persons in the civilian enclosure. 
Teams in the vicinity of the Barrio of San Jose contacted prominent men 
in the area, especially pre-war municipal officials, from whom a list 
of names of pro-Japanese civilians as well as loyal Filipinos was 
obtained and used as a basis for investigation and for the establishment 
of an informant net. Agents located the Dulag branch of Kempei Tai 
(Japanese equivalent of the German Gestapo), searched it, and uncovered 
a considerable amount of valuable data concerning its operations. 
Additional counterintelligence information was obtained from guerrillas' 
operating in that area. 
c. Members of tlie 210th (Xth Corps) Counter Intelligence Corps 
Detachment landed during the assault at San Pedro Bay where they were 
pinned down on the beach for 36 hours. A compound was built in coopera-
tion with the Engineers and Military Police where civilians were placed 
in order to seek out any Japanese who might have infiltrated. Agents 
of this detachment assisted the 459th Area Detachment in a systematic 
.search of the buildings in Tacloban which resulted in the collection of 
some seven hundred'pounds of documents which were immediately dispatched 
to the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section. . 
d. Other agents of the 210th moved inland with Xth Corps 
troops and operated in Alangalang, Jaro, San Miguel, Pastrana, and 
Palo. Municipal police systems were installed in those towns by the 
Counter Intelligence Corps with the cooperation of the Civil Affairs. 
Section. Officials and suspects in the towns were screened and a 
number of investigations were initiated, and all enemy and public in-
stallations were searched. Of all the problems which faced the members 
of this detachment, the most difficult was that of civilian control 
which was enhanced by the large number of alleged collaborationists 
accused by both civilians and guerrillas. In this connection, Counter 
Intelligence Corps and Public Civil Affairs Units (PCAU) worked together. 
These persons were processed at the Prisoner of War stockade in Pawing • 
. Those who were found gull ty of giving aid and comfort to the enemy 
were detained at Corps and, after a thorough investigation, were sent 
to the Area Detachment in.Tacloban with instructions for their 
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. incarceration in the provincial jail until their cases could be heard 
lJy the Commonweal th Government. 
e. Tacloban was the scene of the (JOIst (Ist Cavalry) Counter 
Intelligence Corps Detachment's activities in the initial operation. 
Personnel landed on A-Day ut Cataisan Point just south of Tacloban and 
on the following day entered the city, following closely on the heels 
of tlJe assault troops. These agents conducted searches of the provincial 
capitol, the Kempei Tai Headquarters for Leyte, and Japanese General 
~iakino's command post. On the following day the First Cavalry was 
forced to withdraw from Tac10ban and all initial successes were thereby 
neutralized. 
f. To the agents of the 459th Counter Intelligence Corps Area 
Detacbment fell the responsibility of conducting investigations of 
puolic officials and prospective officials. As a result of several 
. conferences with Commonwealth GovernJJlent representatives, including the 
President. arrangements were made whereby the Counter Intelligence Corps 
was to check all potential appointees to public offices prior to 
appointment. The arrangement included all constabulary and municipal 
personnel which gave the Counter Intelligence Corps at the outset a 
firm and reliable control over the appointments. The activities of the 
459th laid the foundation on which the Government could erect a 
reliable body of .public officials and a trustworthy law enforcement 
organization. 
g. The 77th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment entered 
Ormoc with the assault troops of the 77th Division and soon after trans-
ferred its activities to Valencia, leaving jurisdiction over Ormoc to 
the 7th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. Continuous liaison was 
, maintained with the guerrillas who assisted the Counter Intelligence 
Corps in the maintenance of port security to prevent infiltration of 
enemy agents from neighboring islands. 
71. LESSONS LEARNED. It was found in the Leyte operations, 
particularly in the initial stages, that Counter Intelligence Corps de-
tachments were literally overrun by guerrillas and other zealous citizens 
anxious to denounce "spies" and "collaborators." In detaining these 
people, the Counter Intelligence Corps adhered to the criterion of the 
security of American operations and installations. In the confused 
early stages of the operation, expediency dictated the detention of 
suspects on scant evidence. 
a. Some knowledge of civil affairs was ·found to be necessary 
on Leyte where the Counter Intelligence Corps had to carryon those 
functions during the early days of the invasion. 
b. In addition to carrying out its own duties, as outlined 
in the Standing Operating Procedure, the Counter Intelligence Corps 
organized a temporary police system,· arranged for food, medical aid, and 
shelter for the civilian population until civil affairs personnel 
arrived. 
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72. OPERATIONS m LUZ<11. The first Counter Intelligence Corps 
.,ersonnel landed on Lingayen Gulf on S-Day, 9 January 1945, within an 
hour after the initiol assault troops forged a lleachhead along the 
co~st of Pengasinan Province. By S plus 2, nine Counter Intelligence 
Coi:ps comllat detachments, with a totu 1 complement of 22 officers and 
.ore than 100 agents, were fully operational. As in the initial phase 
of the Leyte campaign, Counter Intelligence Corps operations were under 
the control of the 306th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. 
Z .r c'l -7 
a. At the outset of the Luzon campaign, -four combat detach-
ments operated under the jurisdic.tion of the z::F1th (I Corps) Counter 
Intelligence Corps Detachment, and two were operating under the supervi-
U4~sion of the 200st (XXIV Corps) Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. 
Z<'j'.s".On 11 January, the 2F1th assumed responsibility for securing the area 
selected for GIlQi and as a means of coordinating and disseminating in-
formation received, preparation was made for the periodic distribution 
of a "Counter Intelligence Summary. It This was sent to its sub-
detachments and to those of I Corps. In general, the s.ummary contained 
five sections which included lists of wanted persons, suspects, informa-
tion desired on individuals and organizations, a report of the guerrilla 
situation, and a general summary. Continuous liaison was maintained 
among the various detachments' and other interested agencies. 
b. As the campaign progressed, the Counter Intelligence Corps 
found itself deluged with work concerning the guerrilla movement. This 
consisted mainly in locating them and, after interrogation, some means 
of control over their activities had to be devised. Though the work 
load of the interrogation teams was increased., the Counter Intelligence 
Corps was re\~rded for its efforts by obtaining information on enemy 
psychological warfare and propaganda teChniques, economic and politioal 
conditions, and the whereabouts of military targets. As a result of 
all this intelligence, the G-2 office of United States Army Forces in 
the Far East completed an authentic picture of the Japanese Kempei Tai 
and other enemy counterintelligence groups. A roster was also compiled 
of personnel who had been reported disloyal during the Japanese 
occupation. 
c. In this connection, officers and agents were compelled to 
move with moderation because many of the persons accused of disloyalty 
had been, in rea Ii ty, quite loyal to the Philippine Government. In 
order to insure fairness and justice to the accused, the Counter In-
telligence Corps instituted a Legal Board of Review to look into these 
cases. This board was composed of lawyers who examined the files to 
determine whether a prima-facie case of collaboration had been 
established. The findings of the board were coordinated with the G-2, 
United State~ Army Forces in the Far East. 
d. As the Counter Intelligence Corps moved into towns during 
the advance, many detachments such as the 6th took the initiative in 
reorganizing towns and barrios in the wake of combat troops prior to 
the arrival of Civil Affairs Unit. The officer in charge generally 
called together the mayor, city policemen, and other civil officials, 
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whereupon the detachment conducted an on-the-spot check of their 
loyalty. The mayor was then instructed to call a meeting of local 
officials (past and present), of civilian and Pllilippine Army personnel, 
including local guerdllas. The purpose of this meeting was to orient 
the townspeople, reassure them, and generally to stabilize a panic 
situation. These, and many other similar measures that were instituted 
by the Counter Intelligence Corps, provided rear echelon security which 
was necessary for the successful operation of the troops nearing the 
city of Manila. 
73. THE ENTRY INTO MANILA. The first Counter Intelligence Corps 
headquarters in Manila was established at Bilibid Prison. When it be-
came evident that the city would fall, steps were immediately taken to 
centralize and combine into one unit GHQ, SVlPA, and United States Army 
Forces in the Far East Headquarters. 
a. Counterintelligence activity, though previously l~avy, 
reached the peak for the war following the capture of Manila. The 
greatest burden fell on the Counter Intelligence Corps when it faced 
the task of investigating and recolnr.Jending the disposition of those 
persons gUilty of collaborating with the ener.JY. In addition, the fall 
of the puppet government left the people wi thout the machinery for the 
administration of public affairs. Thousands of Filipinos required 
investigation; some to act in official capacities, others to be employed 
in the United States Army installations. 
b. There was also the continuous necessity of searching and 
seIZIng enemy espionage agents and of maintaining security. During the 
period of "last ditch" fighting in the city, hundreds of suspects were 
interned as security risks. Even after many were cleared and released, 
there remained at the end of March 1,216 internees in the Manila area. 
They fell mostly into the ~las.ification of collaborationists, puppet 
offiCials, enemy nationals, and Kempei Tai agents. 
74. Tn;, F.D~AL PllASE. After the close of the combat phase of the 
Phil ippine campa ign, the work of the Counter Intelligence Corps units 
fell into two maj or categories: investigations, especially of suspected 
collaborationists; and traininG for the Japanese invasion. As the 
enemy's organized groups were pushed further north on Luzon, the enemy 
employed infiltration, espionage, and guerrilla warfare tactics more 
and more. Infiltrators were a problem for the Counter Intelligence 
Corps through 1945. Even after the official surrender, stragglers 
estimated in the thousands continued to make forays from their mountain 
hideaways. It became evident during the planning for the invasion that 
there was a dearth of knowledge concern ina the Japanese, their customs, 
government, and social systems. Immediate steps were taken to obtain 
this information from the authorities on Japanese affairs who were 
available in the Philippines. In June, 1945, a program of lectures by 
sucll authorities was begun, in addition to a complete education prOlJram 
for the troops. 
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75. ClX'lCLlliIct-l. In 1941 there were few personnel and so few di-
rectives that the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps was vague. 
The United Nations had chosen to project the main attack initially 
against the German armies. Most of the problems confronting the .Counter 
Intelligence Corps in the Pacific, therefore, were solved through 
utilizing the experience and lessons learned in the field by the Counter 
Intelligence Corps world-wide. 
a. The surrender of the Imperial Japanese Government on 15 
August 1945 terminated one phase of Counter Intelligence Corps activity, 
but new duties developed during the early days of the occupation of 
Japan. llased on studies made by G-2, GllQ, the Counter Intelligence 
Corps apprehended the first group of war criminals and interned Axis 
nationals. As the occupation progressed, the 44lst Counter Intelligence 
Corps Detachment became a consolidated central unit covering all of 
Japan and followed the pattern developed within the European Theater of 
Operations in Germany. The 44lst became the general procurement agency 
for subsidiary Counter Intelligence Corps organizations and undertook . 
the establishment of a central training school in Tokyo. Geographical 
command suLdivisions such as the XXIV Corps (Korea) and PIIILRYCOM 
(Philippines and Okinawa) developed Counter Intelligence Corps units 
which Lecame locally autnomous but revealed' replacements from the 
44lst in Japan. . 
b. As time went on and the Counter Intelligence Corps gained 
more experience in the field, it 'became evident that additional training 
and preparation of auents was necessary to meet the problems that were 
expected in the new areas. To fill this need, training schools were 
established in the different theaters of operations, the purpose and 
scope of which were determined by the existing situation in each theater. 
C. At Oran the school sought to redefine the mission of the 
Counter Intelligence Corps which, at best, was rather vague in the 
. minds of everyone concerned. 
d. Some lessons had been learned as a result of the activities 
of the Counter Intelligence Corps during and after the invas ion, chief 
among whiCh was the recognition that agents should be selected on the 
.basis of ability to operate in certain areas, As a result, the school 
acted as a screening agency .and the men were assigned to their new tasks 
on the basis of adaptability and, by and large, this screening process 
was successful. 
e. The schools at [3risbane, Australia, performed a similar 
function for SWPA and the Philippines. In this theater the need for 
men trained especially in the languago·a~d customs of the Filipino 
population was clearly recognized and. fulfilled. Moreover, the schools 
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made use of the experiences that were gained as a result of operations 
in the theater. As in Oran, the staff was made up of men who were 
qualified both by training and experience in the field. 
f. The most noteworthy of these trainin\! schools was the 
European Theater Intell i\Jence School (ETL,)), introduced in prance and 
later transferred to O!Jerammervau, Germany. Its purpose was to (Jive 
traininv to intelli(jence personnel who had not been adequately trained 
to meet tile problems of occupation. Under tile capaole leadership of 
men witll scholarly back(jrounds and experience in intelliaence work, 
tile school functioned successfully in tile preparation of rnen for the 
complex tasks involved in the occupation of former enemy territory. 
g. These schools, created as a result of the efforts of far-
siuhted men WIIO saw the need of preparation for any eventuality, were 
unique prouucts of \Jorld War II. They were designeu not so much to 
Vive us experts in the field, out to meet efficiently and adequately 
the proolems that might arise. The results aCllieveu by the men who 
were so trained are a tribute to the leaders who hall the courage of 
tileir convictions and the ability to project theiliselves into the 
future. Thou\lh the Counter Intell ivence Corps entered tllC war period 
witi! little experience and training, it elllerged witl. a definite plan, 
considerable experience, and personnel trained to cope with the' 
inevitable consequences of liar. 
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